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Introduction and Literature Review 
Memories of the brutality of World War II in Germany and Poland focus heavily 
on the victimhood and suffering ofhuman beings as a result of the war. However, during 
this war, many ethnic groups were traumatized by specific incidents or dynamics within 
society. Yet, the memory of a singular traumatic incident often has multiple versions, 
depending upon the ethnic background of both the perceived victim and perpetrator. A 
tragedy can be remembered in many different ways and the roles of perpetrator and 
victim are sometimes blurred. Possession of traumatic memory is further compounded 
by the fact that during World War II, ethnicity in this region was diverse and not always 
clearly defined. 
The city once called Danzig, now named Gdansk is one such place, whose 
memory of multi-dimensional suffering during World War II is possessed by German as 
well as Polish national memory. In this paper, I will analyze Danzig/Gdansk as a place 
where remembrance of suffering during, before, and after the war is constructed around 
feelings of German and/or Polish victimization as a result of the war. This thesis will go 
beyond a re-creation of a space of shared traumatic memory that was the "traumascape" 
of Danzig/Gdansk between 1935 and 1945 and invite the reader to consider the multiple 
versions of traumatic memories possessed by Germans and Poles who lived in and 
around Danzig during the war and suffered as a result. I would argue that the most 
significant aspect of the history, accounts, interviews and personal statements of German 
and Polish residents of Danzig/Gdansk is a tendency by individuals who witnessed and 
perhaps survived the war, to consider only their own ethnicities' suffering at the hands of 
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both the Nazis, the Red Army and Polish communist authorities, instead of a shared 
concept ofvictimhood. Between 1935 and 1945, whether this traumascape was called 
Danzig or Gdansk, Germans and Poles were both perpetrators and victims of suffering, 
despite the predominant memory of those living there that could not or would not 
conceive of any victims of World War II, other than themselves. Ultimately, what 
conceptually separates the city of Danzig from the city of Gdansk, beyond its complete 
destruction and re-construction, are the memories of suffering and trauma by those in the 
region, often defined by ethnicity, gender, and religion. 
This thesis will highlight a number of traumatic memories chronologically in the 
history ofthis city. The Versailles Conference will be the beginning ofthe tale of these 
two cities in the first chapter, Danzig before 1945. The history of the interwar years 
reveals a severe rift between Poland and Weimar Germany over the Free city of Danzig. 
German memory would remember the city's nazification, the invasion by Germany and 
even the relative safety during the war as traumatic through a general feeling that Nazism 
had been forced upon German Danzigers, resulting in their own versions of victimhood. 
On the other hand Polish memory of the inter-war period of Danzig would move from 
memories of economic prosperity following the polonization of the Polish Corridor, to 
notions of victimization at the hands of the Nazis, which escalated considerably during 
and after the German invasion of Danzig in 1939, eventually resulting in population 
transfer. German memories of Danzig in the early months of 1945, in the chapter The 
Refugee City, reveal the city as a refugee outpost and evacuation point in the grip of a 
pre-traumatic terror syndrome, whose German victims could not understand their own 
suffering, embodied in the fear of the Red Army and Soviet acts of reprisal in the east, as 
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being caused directly by their own participation in the Nazi regime. This dynamic 
continues in The Destroyed City, when German suffering was greatly expanded by 
violence, robbery and rape at the hands of the Red Army. It is no surprise that Polish 
memory of the years prior to and during the war would focus on the increasing German 
repression of Poles in Danzig, through forced labor, germanization and population 
transfer. However, Polish memory of the rebuilding and reclaiming efforts discussed in 
The Reclaiming of Gdansk, after the city's capitulation to the Soviets, found justification 
in their role as perpetrators of traumatic incidents, through memories of victimization at 
the hands of the German majority of the city prior to 1945. German memory of 
victimhood in the post-war period would now reflect an experience of suffering, similar 
to what the Nazis had perpetrated against the Poles prior to the fall of Danzig. 
This study will not focus extensively on Jewish memory of Danzig during World 
War II because the history of Jewish suffering in Danzig mainly ends prior to the German 
invasion in September of 1939. Stutthof concentration camp, outside of the city was not 
a major Jewish extermination center until the end of the war. Recent research has even 
disproved the widely held belief that Stutthofhad supposedly delivered Jewish corpses 
from the camp to the Danzig Medical Institute where they were processed into soap. 1 
Without detracting from the victimization of those Danzig Jews who did remain in the 
city after 1939 and suffered during the war, Danzig's small Jewish community did not 
endure the hardships most other German and certainly Polish Jews in the east did. To 
call any group of Jews or other Holocaust victims historically lucky would be very 
difficult to morally substantiate. However, as this analysis will show most Jewish 
1 Joachim Neander, "Th.e Danzig Soap Case: Facts and Legends", German Studies Review Vol.XXIX, 
Num. 1, February 2006, 63-68. 
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Danzigers took the option to escape the city before the war with the help of the British 
and without being hindered by extra Nazi brutality, beyond having to sell their 
possessions. The Jewish communities ofBerlin, Munich, Warsaw, and Prague were by 
and large not given such an option. The importance of the memory of the repression and 
extermination of Jews in the city in this analysis is in its relation to memories of German 
Danzigers who themselves retained a traumatic memory of guilt for not aiding Danzig's 
Jews in their time of need. 
Just as the city itself was once shared by Germans and Poles, the historical 
interpretations ofWorld War II's impact on the citizens of Danzig/ Gdansk represent a 
multitude of contradictory viewpoints. While a great deal of material exists on the Free 
City of Danzig as well as the political upheaval in modem communist Gdansk, very little 
has been written specifically about the political, military, or social history ofDanzig or 
Gdansk during the World War II era. Overall the historiography ofDanzig, reflects the 
wider values of West-German, East-German, and Polish post-war society on the topic of 
self-victimization 
While scholarship written prior to World War II on the history of the city tended 
to focus on the Free City of Danzig's economic history and current political development, 
it would not be until after the war, that notions ofvictimhood based on ethnicity became 
germane. In the post-war era ofthe late 1940s and early 1950s in West Germany, 
scholarship on Danzig found its place within the popular public memory of the war that 
generally emphasized German victimhood. This paradigm is reflected within the 
memoirs and accounts in Theodor Schieder's and Hans Rothfels's highly controversial 
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Documents on the Expulsion of the Germans from Eastern-Central Europe, published by 
the Ministry of Expellees between 1953 though 1964, which included Danzig in its 
examination. These collections of the accounts of expellees from all over Europe and 
parts of the U.S.S.R, provide testimonies of people who lived or were staying in Danzig 
during 1945, describing the emotions that those individuals felt. Schieder, himself a 
former Nazi supporter, has had his work questioned for inaccuracy, virulently anti-
communist right wing partisanship, and reactionary nationalism. Schieder stated that the 
documents were written to" ... make the world aware of things that until now have been 
for the most part hushed up." He believed that the international community had wanted to 
silence German suffering, in favor of a forced sense of collective guilt which stressed 
German perpetration of war crimes. 2 Cataloging of German victimhood continued into 
the 1960s when the Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War Victims in Bonn 
released an extensive pamphlet in 1964 which calculated and organized German loses in 
the east, including Danzig, with precision. The trend of primary sources on Danzig and 
other former German spaces of memory in the east focused exclusively on German losses 
into the early 1960s. 
On the other side of the Iron Curtain, authorities in both Poland and East-
Germany were very critical of such notions of German victimhood, as was reflected by 
historical scholarship and analysis on Gdansk from the communist east during this time. 
While in West Germany, German refugees from Danzig and elsewhere were called 
Vertriebene or "Expellees," in East Germany they were dubbed Aussielder or "Re-
2 Robert G. Moeller, War Stories, (Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 2001), 57-63. 
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settlers" in subscribing to communist vernacular, which downplayed Soviet guilt? In 
communist Poland, the word "Danzig" itself was illegal and discussion which reflected 
upon the traumas that occurred in the city at the hands ofboth the Soviet Union and 
Poland at the end ofwar was considered taboo.4 In the early 1960s, the Polish 
communists produced a number of tourist pamphlets to celebrate the completion of the 
rebuilding of Gdansk. In their brief assessment of the city's history, the word Danzig 
was omitted and any description or analysis of the city's German history was 
intentionally downplayed. Refusal to allow a more accurate and multi-sided discussion 
or analysis of Gdansk would continue until the liberalizations in the communist world in 
the 1980s. 
By the mid-1960s West-German modes of memory were being reworked to 
include admission and acceptance of guilt. Discussion of German suffering was 
relegated to the voices of reactionary politics, in favor of discussions which sought to 
accept and mend the trauma inflicted upon the victims of the Nazis. Philosophers such as 
Theo~or Adorno, Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, as well as Hannah Arendt were 
very critical of West German society's and government's overall denial of their recent 
past. While historical scholarship specifically on Danzig remained scant during this 
period, fiction writer GUnter Grass, one of the most significant voices in the history of the 
city, began writing his "Danzig Trilogy," Die Blechtrommel (The Tin Drum, 1962), Katz 
und Maus (Cat and Mouse, 1963) and Hundejahre (Dog Years, 1965). Grass's writings 
3 Robert G. Moeller, "Germans as Victims? Thoughts on a Post-War History of World War II's Legacies," 
History and Memory, (Indiana Univ. Press, 2005), 11 . 
4 Bozena Shallcross, "The Archaeology ofOcccuptation: Stephan Chwin's Writings on Danzig/Gdansk," 
Framing the Polish Home: Postwar Cultural Constructions of Hearth, Nation, and Self, (Athens, OH: Ohio 
State Univ. Press 2002), 117. 
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go beyond insight into the diversity, personality, and fears of the city's residents and 
serve as an allegory for the conscience of West Germany during the 1960s. Grass's work 
seems to have been generally accepted by the academic community as factually driven 
from the perspective of an eyewitness ofthe rise and fall of Nazism in the city, though he 
himself did not witness the ultimate destruction of Danzig and the birth of Gdansk. 
The literature on Danzig/Gdansk during the 1970s and early 1980s also displays a 
continuation ofthe acceptance and study of German guilt. The year 1970 marked the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of the end of the war and end ofthe Holocaust. That same year 
Herbert Levine published his work on the rise of Nazism in the Free City and the 
suffering of Jews under the Nazis. A decade later the Jewish Museum in New York, 
would show an exhibit on the history of Danzig Jewry. By the late 1980s and 1990s the 
debate on how to remember the suffering of the war began to emerge within a dynamic of 
shared experience and scholarship emerged which suggested that the war had victimized 
Germans, Jews, and Poles in unique ways, and that these sufferings could be juxtaposed. 
As the Eastern Bloc began to crumble, scholarship by historians in the east 
displayed a more accurate history of the city. The "Liberalization of Scholarship" under 
Premier General J aruzelski facilitated this in Poland during the 1980s. 5 Nonetheless, 
communist authorities were unwilling to allow a complete liberalization of censorship on 
the memory of Gdansk. For example, although Grass had a good relationship with the 
government of communist Poland for his stance on the Oder-Neisse line decision, his 
most influential work, Blaszany bs;benek (The Tin Drum), was not published there until 
5 Carl Tighe, Gdansk: ~ational Identity in the Polish-German Borderlands, (London, UK: Pluto Press, 
1990), xix-xx. 
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1983 and its Polish translation continued to name the city "Gdansk," though Grass had 
written it as "Danzig."6 
In the last twenty-five years, interest in the history of Danzig/Gdansk has grown 
tremendously throughout the historical world in conceptualizing modes of remembrance. 
In 1990, Carl Tighe produced the most comprehensive English language history ofthe 
city. His work, titled Gdansk/Danzig sought to connect the city to the larger arena of 
East Prussia and Pomerania, both of which possessed a shared German and Polish 
heritage. A more recent epistemological trend in the scholarship on this period has 
promoted the idea of"working through," as a method of reading, writing, and thinking 
about shared histories of suffering as a result of World War II. This concept has different 
definitions depending on the scholar, but ultimately it refers to the process of working 
through all the material of controversial topics such as suffering associated with the end 
of the war and not simply examining German, Polish or Jewish suffering exclusively. 
German post-war scholars such as Robert Moeller have suggested that "Aufarbeitung" or 
the concept of working through German history should encompass writers ofboth fiction 
and non-fiction in portraying a constructive history which seeks to improve present 
memory, by considering all angles of a topic such as traumatic history.7 Moeller, in his 
2001 book War Stories: The Search for A Useable Past in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, as well as several subsequent article publications researched the memory of 
German suffering in Post War Germany, asserting that it is possible and ethical to write a 
6 Ibid, 277-281. 
7 Robert Moeller, "Sinking Ships, the Lost Heimat and Broken Taboos: Gunter Grass and the Politics of 
Memory in Conternpor~ry Germany." Contemporary European History Vol. 12, (NY: Columbia Univ. 
Press, 2003), 180. 
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military history of the war's end in "which Germans caused immeasurable suffering and 
Germans suffer immeasurably."8 
With the fall of communism discussion of previously controversial topics such as 
the history of Gdansk, were no longer subject to censorship. Polish fiction writer Stefan 
Chwin brought his story Hanemann, later translated to English as Death in Danzig, to the 
international literary scene in 1995, painting a history of the city from the perspective of 
Polish memory. Recent secondary literature from Poland tends to discuss Gdansk within 
the entire scope of cities of shared memory at the end of the war. Polish historian 
Bemadetta Nitschke's 2004 publication, translated into German as Vertreibung und 
Aussiedlung DerDeutschen Bevolkerung aus Polen 1945 bis 1949 is the most recent and 
most comprehensive scholarly work which includes Gdansk in its assessment of post-war 
history. In terms of specific history on Gdansk, Sylwia Bykowska's 2005 article 
"Gdansk-miasto (szybko) odzyskane" ("Gdansk a city (quickly) recovered") in the Polish 
journal Biuletyn Instytutu Pamieci Narodowej, divulged a more complex and 
encompassing history of the city, in examining the motivations and memories ofthe 
Polish re-claiming efforts after the war's end suggests that Polish authorities were also 
perpetrators of trauma. 
Within the last few years, historical research in English on cities such as Gdansk, 
Szczecin, Wroclaw, and other places of shared Polish and German memory has been 
pursued extensively. Following his seminal multi-volume work God's Playground: A 
History of Poland, Norman Davies published a study in 2002 entitled Microcosm: 
Portrait of a Central European City, which focused on the history ofBreslau/Wroclaw as 
an example of a place of shared German and Polish memory. One recent trend among 
8 Moeller, "Germa~s as Victims? Thoughts ... ," 5. 
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historians such as Elizabeth Clark and literary experts such as Joanna Stimmel has been 
to look at the visual evidence of the destruction of Danzig, and the rebuilding of Gdansk, 
formulating the idea that the traumatic memory of the Danzig's destruction should be 
considered part of a shared catastrophe. Both scholars are interested in material and 
architectural history and in examining the city's complex and violent history. Their 
studies, based mainly on modem Polish history and literature respectively, are among the 
first attempts to examine the history of this city, specifically through modes of trauma 
remembrance as shared memories between Germans, Poles, and Jews in Danzig/ Gdansk. 
What is lacking from the literature is a serious consideration of the history of 
Danzig/Gdansk and the ways shared memories of victimhood were constructed by 
Germans and Poles. A study which looks at actual descriptions and memories of 
suffering and victimhood in order to attain a true sense of the traumascape in Danzig/ 
Gdansk between 1935 and 1945. In a place like Danzig or Gdansk, where the very 
definitions of perpetrator versus victim or Germans versus Pole are blurred, working 
through all versions of traumatic memory is necessary in formulating a complete history 
of the end of the city once named Danzig and the rebirth of the city now called Gdansk. 
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Danzig Before 1945 
With the passing of World War I, Danzig had experienced a hundred years 
without being directly involved in, a witness to, or affected by any sort of significant 
trauma, a fact of which few major cities in Eastern France, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Germany, and Poland could boast. Danzig's port was mainly used in support of the 
eastern front and the city witnessed no combat, destruction, or significant loss of life. 
While Danzig was of minor importance in the Great War's military history, its 
importance as an item on the diplomatic agenda of the post-war decision-making process 
was key. The decision to establish the Free City of Danzig, separated from Germany by 
the Polish Corridor to the Baltic Sea, was not popular with the ethnic German residents 
who comprised ninety-five percent of the population of Danzig. The inter-war period in 
the Free State was marked by economic and ethnic competition between Poland and 
Danzig. Worldwide depression, increased economic competition and fear ofpolinization 
in Danzig, all resulted in economic support and relief from Weimar Germany, which led 
to the nazification ofDanzig politics. International scrutiny of the Free State grew soft 
during the 1930s due to the perception that the region problems had stabilized, resulting 
in the complete nazification ofDanzig politics, whose first victims were Danzig's Jewish 
community 
Though separated geographically from Germany, it is accurate to say that 
Danzig's government, politics, and most residents were under the control of the Nazi 
party by 1935. The Free State of Danzig still existed as a politically autonomous entity. 
Danzig was Hitler's first military target and the first battle of World War II took place in 
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the streets and harbors of the city. Just as Germans in Danzig had actively supported the 
nazification of Danzig's politics, they were equally complicit in the invasion as the 
German population knew preemptively that Hitler was going to invade their city. 
Danzigers also did not come to the aid of the Polish military targets in the city. After 
takeover, nazification of the city's population, as well as the complete transformation of 
Gdynia, Danzig's former competitor to the north, became the new priority for the Nazis. 
Danzig by and large was not affected by the ravages of World War II until 1945, 
allowing the German authorities to pursue a racially homogenous Gau of Danzig-West 
Prussia. 
Despite these historical realities, memories ofboth Germans and Poles, born and 
raised in Danzig during the inter-war period and recorded as adults after the war, focus on 
establishing their innocence in the nazification and invasion of the Free City and their 
own victimization at the hands of the Nazi authorities. Accounts and interviews of 
individuals who lived in the Free City during the inter-war period describe it as a place 
where Germans and Poles lived in harmony, despite political tensions between Weimar 
Germany, Poland and Danzig. Positive memories of this period change into memories of 
personal victimization at the hands of the Nazis during the outbreak of World War II in 
Danzig. Both Germans and Poles remembered the invasion of the city as something that 
was forced upon Danzig, where working class people of both ethnicities suffered. It is 
not surprising that memory of those Poles who remained in the city focuses on their own 
suffering through forced germanization and population transfer. What is surprising is 
that Germans living in Danzig, which by all accounts must have been one of the safest 
and least war-tom places in the Third Reich, retained a traumatic memory of the war 
12 
years prior to 1945. Even though they enjoyed the status of the dominant ethnic group in 
a secluded military position, German memory from this time had a predictive quality 
which foresaw that Danzig Germans would one day bear the brunt of the suffering at the 
war's end, following the unavoidable defeat of Hitler. 
The Allied powers came to the Versailles table in 1919 fully convinced that a 
strong and independent Poland was the only way to check future German aggression. 
Granting Poland access to the sea was seen as crucial to giving the country the ability to 
fill its newly conceived role and donating Danzig to Poland seemed the most obvious 
solution. Wilson had proposed this idea within the Fourteen Points and was supported by 
Clemenceau, only the British delegation was hesitant to support so drastic and permanent 
a solution in such a multi-ethnic region. In 1918 the British Foreign Office had already 
declared that "for the sake of Poland's own future, we must firmly oppose exaggerated 
Polish claims."9 British skepticism for simply giving Danzig to Poland, led to the 
alternative plan by James W. Headlam-Morley to create a completely autonomous Free 
City protected by the League ofNations. 10 Poland was given a corridor to the sea, cutting 
Danzig off from Germany, which for the Poles was at least a halfvictory and gave them 
an opportunity to pursue Danzig in the future. Most important for Poland was the 
continuation of its export up the Vistula, without toll or hindrance, as well as to stay 
connected to the Baltic shipping economy. With the creation of a corridor, the Poles 
9 Christopher M. Kimmlich, The Free City: Danzig and the German Foreign Policy, (New Haven, CT: Yale 
Univ. Press, 1968), 3-4: 
10 Ibid, 10. 
13 
realized that export did not necessarily need to go through Danzig anymore and that 
"Danzig needed Poland, more than Poland needed Danzig." 11 
When the Allied powers ratified Section XI of the Treaty of Versailles on 10 
January 1919, the city became known as Freie Stadt Danzig to Germans and Wolne 
Miasto Gdansk to Poles. However, the latter of these two ethnic communities was 
vociferously outraged at the results of Versailles. In March of that year 70,000 to 
100,000 Danzigers rallied to protest the separation of their city geographically from 
Germany proper. 12 A rally of that size, approximately a quarter of the city's population, 
reveals a general sentiment of Danzigers' dislike of the results of international 
peacemaking, while simultaneously showing affinity and continued support for Germany, 
the same country which had aggressively instigated, exacerbated, and pursued the last 
war, causing the death ofhundreds ofthousands of Germans across Europe. Though few 
in Danzig had any idea of what it was like to have a city shelled or burnt, to have the 
young male populations of entire neighborhoods and hamlets listed as casualties of war, 
or to have women raped by marauding soldiers and fewer still had any recollection of the 
last time any sort of storm of violence had rained down on Danzig. 
The law of Danzig was to be enforced by the League of Nations, independent of 
the Weimar Republic and Poland, but this was hardly the case. Protection of Danzig and 
its German population was supremely important to Weimar foreign policy and managed 
to influence politics in the Free City. For instance, career bureaucrats from the Weimar 
government dominated the civil service of Danzig throughout the interwar period. Also, 
11 Elizabeth Clarke, "Reshaping the Free City: Cleansed Memory in Danzig/Gdansk, 1939-1952," Ethnic 
Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe, (Columbia University Press, NY 2003), 3. 
12 John B. Mason, The Danzig Dilemma: A Study in Peacemaking by Compromise, (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford Univ. Press, 1946), 6. 
14 
during times of economic hardship in Danzig, especially during the world-wide 
depression of the 1930s, Germany consistently stepped in to provide economic relief to 
Danzig, so that nothing could diminish the precious sense of Deutschum or perceived 
cultural, linguistic, and national connectedness to Germany, which the city was trying to 
retain. Throughout the 1920s, Danzig remained economically dependent upon foreign 
aid, mainly from Germany. Political and economic problems in Germany in the wake of 
Versailles played out in a similar, though much smaller scale in Danzig. 13 
The Free City of Danzig was supposed to be a model of inter-ethnic co-operation 
' 
and co-habitation with Poland where Germans and Poles were to live in economic and 
political harmony, though this was hardly the case. As a result of the Russo-Polish War 
in 1920, the city's trade with Poland was non-existent, causing a major depression there. 
Almost immediately after the end of the war, Poles began buying up property in Danzig 
on a large scale as property prices had dropped considerably. German anti-Polish 
agitation was ever present and increasing during the Free City period, often manifesting 
itself in slowing down and sabotaging the Polish exports, going through the city. 
Germans in Danzig felt particularly threatened by the Polish Post Office which opened in 
1920, Polish control of the railroad, and the Polish garrison on the Westerplatte, as they 
were all constant reminders ofPoland's omnipresence in the city. By 1930, the Polish 
population of Danzig grew to about 50,000, eighty percent of whom were members of 
'· ~ 
community associations, cultural institutions, or subscribed to newspapers for Poles. 
Relations between Warsaw and Danzig deteriorated, particularly in 1923 when Lithuania 
13 Ibid, 29-53. 
15 
seized the city ofMemel. Rumors that Poland would do the same to Danzig reached 
Berlin and troops were mobilized on both sides of the border. 14 
Economic competition between Danzig and Poland led to increased polonization 
of the Polish Corridor, particularly through the economic development ofGdynia. After 
a decade of struggling to share the port of Danzig with German dominated interests in the 
city, the Polish government encouraged the expansion ofthe port ofGdynia, ten miles to 
the north.15 The Polish Corridor by this time had been heavily polonized and many 
Germans had already been squeezed out ofboth Gdynia and the Corridor. 16 What was 
once a tiny fishing village in 1920 was transformed into a prosperous port, which by 1930 
exceeded Danzig by twice the tonnage ofboth imports and exports. With the 
development of the port of Gdynia, Poland no longer had to rely on the hostile Danzigers 
to export its goods. The Poles used Gdynia to harass and rival Danzig, to the point where 
the League High Commission had to step in and establish trade quotas to ameliorate the 
situation. 17 By 1933, Gdynia had become Europe's ninth largest port and any trade up 
the Vistula to Danzig was done merely to fulfill international quotas. 18 
The political and economic realities of the inter-war period in the Free State of 
Danzig would suggest that a severe rift existed between the German majority and Polish 
minority in Danzig. However, the memories of residents who were children during this 
period suggest that Germans and Poles lived in harmony with one another. Lajica 
Lewandowska, a Pole born in Danzig in 1929, stated that although her family was 
ethnically Polish, they usually spoke German and that she didn't even start to speak 
14 Tighe, 104-105. 
15 Mason, 105-109. 
16 Tighe, 92. 
17 Mason, 109-125 
18 Tighe, 104-105. 
16 
Polish until after the war. Growing up she went to a school where both Germans and 
Polish teachers taught a class of German and Polish students in German. Lewandowska 
stated that "Before the war everyone lived peacefully."19 Likewise, the account of Gisela 
Lehmann, an ethnic German born in 1933, recalled that growing up during this period in 
Danzig was a positive experience, "without many troubles."20 Both the memories of 
Lehmann; a German and Lewandowska; a germanized Pole, seem to emphasize that 
ethnic tensions in Danzig did not exist, despite growing political strife between Germany 
and Poland, with the Free City of Danzig in the cross-fire. These positive memories of 
the interwar period would later tum into notions of victimization at the hands ofNazis 
during the beginning and the end of the war in Danzig. 
Throughout the 1930s Danzig was dependent on German trade, diplomacy, and 
political direction more than ever. Economically, Danzig was doing more business than 
it had in two decades, despite diminished trade with Poland, because the German 
government guaranteed a certain amount of business to go through the city' s port as a 
supplement.21 The worldwide depression in the 1930s once again required Germany to 
aid Danzig economically, which simultaneously allowed Versailles revisionism to 
flourish. This decade witnessed a never ending attempt by both the governments of the 
Weimar Republic and Danzig to revise the ruling on its Free State status in the Versailles 
settlement. Several times the League ofNations rejected referendums from the people of 
Danzig to return to Germany proper. Economic aid from Germany carried with it the 
disease of the growing right-wing political activism in the Weimar republic. The world 
19 "Lajica Lewandowska interview," conducted by author, 3114/06. 
20 Gisela Lehmann, "The Developments leading up to our forced resettlement from our original homeland," 
(Koln, 1950), 1. . 
21 Mason, 26-101. 
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began to see Weimar revisionism and the rise ofNational Socialism as part of the same 
problem, causing any questions concerning the return to Germany of Danzig or the 
Corridor to be suspended. 22 
While the history of National Socialism's growth in the Free City of Danzig is not 
unusual to any German city at this time, most Germans in Danzig seemed to embrace 
Nazism enthusiastically. Mirroring the Weimar republic, The Free City's political arena 
was awash with different political parties and affiliations. The early Volkish parties 
found their place in Danzig politics, along with the communists, centrist Catholic, and 
polish parties. The main challenge for right wing politics in the 1920s was internal 
bickering and power struggles, mirroring those in Munich at the time. 23 Albert Hohnfeldt 
is generally credited for initially bringing Nazism to Danzig. A native of Danzig, 
Hohnfeldt left his home to participate in the "Beer Hall Putsch" of 1923 in Munich and 
returned two years later to form a Danzig wing of the SA. It was not until 1930, that 
Herman Goring installed Albert Forster to guide National Socialism in the Free City, 
naming him Gauleiter of the Danzig Nazi party. Known for his powerful oratorical skills, 
Forster, who despite not a being a native Danziger but a Bavarian, was successful 
because he implemented elements ofNational Socialism from Germany, which had been 
the base of much ofNazi political success up to this point in the Free City, while 
avoiding international attention to the growing city's right-wing. Forster brought with 
him youth movements, the Danziger Vorposten propaganda newspaper and support from 
the rural districts within the Free State. Forster also encouraged street warfare against 
communists, Jews and Poles. It could be said that Forster's most important tactic in 
22 Kimmlich, 160-166. 
23 Herbert Levine, Hitler's Free City: A History ofthe Nazi Party in Danzig, 1925-1939, (Chicago, Ill: 
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1970), 18-30. 
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gaining support in Danzig, was that he made the Danzig Germans believe that Hitler 
cared about the city and made them believe him. On the eve of the 1930 election he 
united the squabbling right wing political groups in Danzig and led the Nazis to gain 
16.1% ofthe vote in the Danzig Senate (18.3% in the Weimar election ofthat year).24 
The German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of 1934, which outlined peaceful 
relations between these two nations was the key event in dictating the future ofNazi 
dominated politics in the Free City of Danzig. Hermann Rauschning, who the Danzig 
Nazi party had elected to be its chairman and to serve as the city's Senate president, 
signed an agreement with Polish Premier J6zefPilsudski to guarantee that Polish 
language, culture, and education in the city would be preserved, and that the rights of 
both Catholic and Jewish citizens of Poland be maintained. In return the Poles agreed to 
a more equitable split of the commerce coming up the Vistula River. The League of 
Nations witnessed this seeming act of good will as a sign that this region and its ethnic 
and national questions had been resolved. Following the Non-Aggression pact the 
League unofficially phased itself out of any current or future arbitrations processes 
between Poland and Germany over Danzig.25 This allowed the Nazis in the city to use 
increased street violence against their opposition in the 1935 election, in which the Nazi 
party took the majority of the Senate. Immediately, laws banning opposition parties and 
repression of the rights ofPoles and Jews, public segregation, and legal restrictions 
emerged.26 By the later part of the 1930s, Danzig politics was firmly under the thumb of 
Hitler. The League made no official comment or response to this violence and results of 
the election and it seemed as ifboth the League and the Polish government washed their 
24 Ibid, 31-35 
25 Ibid, 53-69. 
26 Ibid, 81-121. 
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hands of the Danzig issue. At this point the Free City of Danzig was free only in name 
and the politics and authority of Berlin would now determine its future course of the city. 
Now that Danzig politics and law were determined by Hitler, Nazi authorities in 
the city soon began initiating a policy of Gleichschaltung, the process ofnazification, 
whose first target was Danzig's Jewish population. Since Kristallnacht in Danzig on 12 
November 1938, a few days after it had transpired in Weimar Germany, Nazi authorities 
in the city made it their agenda to force most of the 6,000 Jews in Danzig (2% of the 
city's overall population) to leave prior to the invasion. Following the enactment of the 
Nuremberg Laws in Danzig later that month, Danzig's Jews faced constant harassment 
and laws which sub-humanized them, causing Jewish emigration from the city to begin. 
The first Jews to leave were those with Polish citizenship, who had the ability to simply 
move a few miles away from Danzig to the Polish Corridor. On 17 December 1939, 
2,000 gathered at Danzig's Great Synagogue and were convinced by Rabbi Hermann 
Segall to flee the city. He had been contacted by Nazi officials and told that if the Jews 
of the city did not leave immediately they would be subject to worse treatment. Segal 
convinced his congregation that with guaranteed help from the British, Danzig's Jews 
would be transported to Palestine. Though they would have to pay for their own transfer 
from the city, Forster himself had promised the Rabbi that they would not be molested if 
they left Danzig. 27-. On 3 March 1939 the first transport of five-hundred Danzig Jews left 
for Palestine, without any problems. When Danzig was invaded in September only 
seventeen-hundred registered Jews were left in the city, most of whom were elderly and 
eventually transferred to Theresianstadt concentration camp.28 While Stutthof 
27 Ibid, 126-135 
28 Levine, 137-138: 
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concentration camp, which had existed several miles east of Danzig since 1939 would 
have been the likely destination for the handful of Jews who remained, this camp mostly 
served to imprison and liquidate Poles from the region, as well as interned Soviet and 
British POWs. In fact Nazi authorities did not designate Stutthof as a major internment 
or extermination center for Jews until 1944.29 
One eyewitness to the repression of Jews in Danzig in the 1930s is GUnter Grass, 
who simultaneously blames Danzigers, especially Christian clergymen, for allowing the 
repression of the city's Jews, while retaining his own sense of victimization for being 
complicit in the Holocaust. In his 1980 essay entitled "What Shall We Tell Our 
Children," Grass recalls, growing up in the Danzig suburb of Langfuhr, the day when the 
SA burnt down the synagogue which was on the same street as the Church of The Sacred 
Heart, where he served as an alter boy when he was not participating as a loyal Hitler 
Youth. Grass remembered his bishops and priests standing by and remaining silent on 
the repression of their fellow Danzigers and fellow human beings. They did not even 
utter a word of disgust for the anti-Semitic violence, or a prayer for the victims. He 
writes, "Individual Christians and Christian groups share the utmost bravery in resisting 
Nazism, but the cowardice of the Catholic and Protestant churches in Germany made the 
churches inactive accomplices."30 As a Danziger he works through the trauma of how he 
and his family, neighbors, friends, and fellow Christians could stand by and allow such a 
thing to happen. Grass's accusations firmly place the blame on both the lay population, 
and on the Danzig clergy in there compliance with Nazism. 
29 Alexander Braun, "History," Pans two we Muzeum Stutthof website. 
30 Gunter Grass, "Wha~ Shall We Tell Our Children," Danzig 1939: Treasures of a Destroyed Community, 
(Jewish Museum, NY: Wayne St. Univ. Pub, 1980), 21-22. 
21 
Yet, Gunter Grass retained a sense of suffering for the guilt of being a perpetrator 
in the Holocaust. He reported that later in life he suffered from nightmares because of 
this guilt. He writes, "I could not swear that had I been six or seven years older, I would 
not have participated in the great crime. My doubts were such that I was plagued (more 
and more often as time passed) by nightmares in which I felt myself to be guilty."31 
Most Gern1an and Polish witnesses to these events in Danzig, including Lewandowska 
and Lehmann, who are about Grass age's, stated that they were unaware of the crimes 
being committed against Jews until after the war. Their memory of the war focuses 
exclusively on their own suffering at the hands of the Nazis. Grass as an eyewitness 
rejects their innocence, emphatically stating that he and almost all other Danzigers young 
and old were privy to and often served as agents in the perpetration of Jewish victimhood. 
Grass's traumatic memories differ from standard German and Polish memory of the 
nazification of Danzig in that his acknowledges being a perpetrator, instead of a victim of 
the Nazis 
Most German Danzigers surely sensed that Hitler would invade the city and return 
it to the Third Reich. On 31 August 1945, he notified the German foreign office in 
Danzig that military takeover of the city would begin the next day?2 Reportedly, anyone 
who ventured out into the street of Danzig early in the morning of 1 September would 
have seen German news reel crews setting up and waiting for something to film. 
Whether Polish citizens, civil service, or military in Danzig were privy to this advanced 
knowledge is not known; however, the Germans who had been made aware of the 
31 Ibid. 
32 Tighe, 148-149. 
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impeding invasion did nothing to stop the German military from striking them. The 
Schlesweg-Holstein fired on Polish warehouses on the docks, while German troops 
occupied the Polish operated railway station and customs office. The Poles locked inside 
the Post Office held out, until a battalion of SS-Heimwehr burnt out the resistance with 
flame throwers, executing all who surrendered. It took five days for the German army to 
subdue the Polish garrison on the Westerplatte. As Hitler and Forster formally 
announced the return of Danzig to Germany, Wehrmacht troops swept into the city, on 
route to reclaiming the rest of the Corridor and later Poland. Civilian casualty rates as a 
direct result of the invasion were minimal and those who died in the fighting were mainly 
Polish dock workers and civil servants.33 
Both German and Polish memory ofthe events of 1 September 1945 focus 
strongly on trauma through victimization as working class Danzigers who stood against 
Nazi authorities in their annexation of the city. The memories of both a German and 
germanized Pole in Danzig who witnessed these events seem to emphasize that this 
invasion was something which Danzigers did not support and which caused them and 
their families a great deal of personal trauma. Gisela Lehmann recalled being awakened 
that day by shots and then witnessed her father's arrest by the Gestapo. He had refused to 
join the party and remained a member of a labor union until his arrest, which resulted in 
the loss of his rights as a citizen, his job at the railways, and his immediate drafting into 
the army.34 Lajica Lewandowska, who was eleven years old in 1939, experienced a 
similar set of traumatic memories that day. Her father, also a railroad worker was 
arrested on 1 September, for complaining about the German invasion of Danzig. He had 
33 Ibid, 150-151. 
34 Lehmann, 1. 
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fought for Germany during World War I and even had proof of his veteran's status with 
him as he was taken to prison. Nevertheless, he was detained for three weeks, causing 
him also to be fired from his job?5 
While the Lehmann and Lewandowska families possess traumatic memories of 
the invasion of Danzig, which they opposed and suffered for as a consequence, most 
citizens remained passive during Hitler's invasion. No records or reports indicate that the 
people of the so called Free city offered any resistance to the soldiers storming the 
railroad, customs offices and government buildings, nor aiding the Polish resistance in 
the post office and Westerplatte garrison. In fact, Danzigers by and large seemed to 
welcome the invasion, considering that Hitler was greeted by thousands as a savior when 
he made his first official visited on 20 September. 36 Yet, the memories of Gisela 
Lehmann and Lajica Lewandowska are an attempt in trying to distance themselves and 
their families from those Danzigers who welcomed the Nazis. Both accounts also 
describe 1 September 1939 as a day when both German and Polish working class people 
suffered. Yet the history of the city's invasion seems to indicate that working class 
people supported Danzig's return to Gern1any. The traumatic memories of both women's 
fathers have several commonalities. The city's railroad industry had been mainly 
manned and run by Poles, who as blue collar laborers were no doubt subject to leftist 
politics, making both men doubly suspect in the eyes of the German authorities, no matter 
what their ethnicity was. Both women's accounts stated their families didn't belong to 
any political parties or ethnic organizations and were completely apolitical, yet both had 
fathers who were arrested on this day for political reasons, causing their children to retain 
35 Lewandowska interview. 
36 Tighe, 150-151. . 
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a traumatic memory ofthe 1 September 1945. Perhaps the most significant commonality 
between the memories of Lehmann and Lewandowska is what they fail to remember or 
omitted when they were recorded as adults with post-war hindsight. Neither Lehmann's 
account, recorded as an expellee in Cologne in 1950, nor Lewandowska's interview in 
March of 2006, display any attempt to consider how their respective families may have 
been complacent towards, in denial of, or even played an indirect role in the nazification 
of Danzig. 
As the Jews of Danzig had for the most part been eliminated as a significant 
presence prior to 1939, nazification efforts in Danzig focused much more on eliminating 
the Polish presence from the region. Danzig law had already succeeded in prohibiting 
Poles from owning motorcycles, cars, radios, telephones, and record players. Now, 
nazification was to be carried out throughout the newly formed Gau ofDanzig-West 
Prussia to eliminate all evidence of Polish existence and prosperity. Beyond renaming 
Polish streets and towns, stripping Poles of their rights and eliminating the speaking or 
teaching of Polish, the German authority's prerogative of Gleichschaltung was the 
complete elimination of the Polish national element in all its forms and manifestations in 
the Gau ofDanzig-West Prussia.37 
The Nazi policy of Gleichschaltung faced the challenge of how to deal with 
Danzig's inherently multi-ethnic character. In Danzig the lines between who was 
German and who was Polish were not always clear, as many people had Germans 
surnames, but spoke Polish, or Polish names but spoke German. It terms of fulfilling 
their goals of an ethnically homogenous Gau of Danzig-West Prussia, the Nazi 
authorities pursued a policy of categorization along ethnic lines. They had little difficulty 
37 Levine, 154-157. 
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in deciding the fate ofPolish citizens and any Pole who had moved to Danzig-West 
Prussia after 1918 was transferred. This was true in other eastern Gaus and by the end of 
October of 1939, 30,000 to 40,000 Poles were expelled from Danzig, Pomerania, and the 
areas of the former Polish Corridor combined.38 Danzig was an ethnically peculiar place 
because its population included a small percentage ofKashubians, Kosnavians, and 
Masurians, Slavic groups native to the Baltic region that had been germanized over the 
centuries and had been interacting with, marrying, and living in close proximity to ethnic 
Germans and Poles. These mixed ethnicities embodied the less than clear-cut problem 
for the new hyper-germanization policy of the Nazi authorities. In their never ending 
pursuit of categorizing existence, the Nazis found ways to build a racial hierarchy, even 
in a place like Danzig. Generally these mixed ethnic groups were considered 
"Nichtdeutsche." Although this distinction placed them at the bottom of the racial 
pyramid, they were German enough not to be transferred, a situation in which they would 
again find themselves in the spring and summer of 1945.39 
Gauleiter Albert Forster favored retaining some Poles for labor forcing them to in 
essence become German on paper. His policy of nazification by 1941 employed the 
process of screening the Gau's population according to Reich standards, followed by 
deportation of excess Polish and Jewish individuals, and the resettlement of Poles to the 
Wartheland, the General Government and the Baltic regions.40 Those Poles who were 
not deported were forced to apply for the German Volksliste, a national register of 
Germans in the region. Those who refused were threatened with imprisonment or 
38 Tighe, 165-166. 
39 1bid, 166 
40 Elizabeth Harv~y, Women and the Nazi East: Agents and Witnesses of Germanization, (New Haven, CT: 
Yale Univ. Press, 2003), 82-83. 
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deportation.41 Lajica Lewandowska recalled that everyone she knew was declaring 
themselves German after September 1939. She stated that the Nazis categorized those on 
the Volksliste into a four class system ofvarying levels of"germaness." The fourth or 
bottom class was a grant of German citizenship given to Poles, which gave the 
government the option of revoking this privilege anytime without a reason, which would 
result in deportation. Lewandowska stated that she, her family, and most Poles were at 
the bottom of this list. Memories of the Volksliste went beyond mere feelings of 
alienation, also invoking memories of extreme violence against the Polish presence in 
Danzig. She noted that immediately following the invasion all Polish priests who had not 
fled the city were rounded up and shot instead ofbeing placed on the Volksliste. As a 
deeply religious Polish Roman Catholic this traumatic memory in particular haunted 
Lewandowska. The memory of these dead clergymen, now immortalized by a statue in 
Gdansk, remains with her to this day.42 
One area in the Gau which the Nazis focused particular attention towards the 
nazification ofwas the renamed and reclaimed city ofGotenhafen. This city known to 
Poles prior to the invasion as Gdynia was completely built, modernized and made 
successful by the Polish interwar government, as its first true Baltic port. To the Nazi 
authorities it was a place of ridicule, distaste and un-cleanliness that needed to be 
reclaimed into the German cultural space. Dr. Richard Csaki of the Deutsches Auslands-
Institut had visited Gdynia in the spring of 1939, prior to the invasion, in an undercover 
investigation of whether the city might one day be fit for German habitation. He found 
Gdynia, as the Poles had constructed it, to be a "Gigantomaniac" place of American-
41 Bernadette Nitschke, Vertreibung and Aussiedlung Der Deutschen Bevolkerung aus Polen 1945 bis 
]949, (Munich: R Oldenbourg Verlag, 2004), 139. 
42 Lewandowska intervi~w. 
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influenced institutional architecture. Margarete Blasche, a teacher from Schneidemuhl, 
took a tour of Gotenhafen in 1940 and compared the boring Polish architecture with the 
beauty ofDanzig's architecture and wrote that it was the product of"Capitalist spirit and 
soulless internationalism." In 1941 a Nazi women's periodical called NS-Frauenwarte 
published an article by Renate von Steda, who reported how disgusting and vile 
confiscated Polish houses in the city were and that "gas had to be used to rid them of 
vermin before German people could be accommodated there." 43 
Gdynia had been reclaimed by Germans as Gotenhafen in accordance with 
Hitler's general policy of Lebensraum, but still had remained a gross codeword for Polish 
inferiority, un-cleanliness, and capitalist endeavors. Where the German culture of Danzig 
appeared to be orderly, rational, and tidy, Polish culture in Gdynia was industrial, 
disconnected, random, and disorderly.44 Interestingly, all these accounts refer to the city 
as Gdingen, the German translation ofGdynia and not the city's new name: Gotenhafen. 
This suggests that the writers of these statements felt that the city was still awash in the 
impurity of polonization, manifested in the physical state and appearance of Gotenhafen 
and that in order to reclaim the cultural space of this city, much more action would be 
required by Germans than mere name changes. The main result of this dynamic in 
Gotenhafen, as well as other places in the Danzig region was the dislocation or transfer of 
entire town populations in the areas of the Gau, which had formally been part of the 
Polish Corridor, to fulfill the reclaiming of space.45 
Germanization through population transfer was not particular to Gdynia or the 
former Polish Corridor, and Polish memory of the interwar years in the city of Danzig 
43 Harvey, 125-129. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid, 90. 
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reflects this final stage of Polish victimization at the hands ofthe Nazis. Lewandowska's 
memory of her family's existence under the Nazis during World War II indicates that 
despite years of accepted germanization prior to 1939 and forced germanization 
immediately afterwards, Poles who remained in the city continued to suffer heavily. 
Although her father was eventually released from prison and able to find work at a 
shipyard outside the city, her brothers, ages sixteen and twenty-one, were sent to work in 
Germany. Her uncle, who had been forced to hide outside of Danzig as he had been a 
railroad official, was discovered and sent to a labor camp, causing his wife to commit 
suicide in 1943.46 Polish memory ofthe war indicates that suffering inflicted by the 
Nazis upon Poles who remained in Danzig was continuously evolving and resulted in the 
complete eradication of a Polish presence in the region through population transfer. 
Although Danzig was a relative safe haven throughout most of the war, German 
memory of life in the city between 1939 and late 1944 expresses a sense of a pre-
traumatic stress syndrome within the city's seclusion and safety. Although Hitler had 
used it as a staging point in 1939 to take Poland and sweep up the Baltic coast as well as 
during Operation Barbarossa in 1941, Danzig was fairly untouched by the ravages of 
World War II. The city's port served as an assembly base for submarines, which were 
tested in the Bay ofDanzig. In July 1942, the British RAF bombed the base with 
minimal damage to either the base or Danzig's production output.47 Beyond these 
isolated events, such as the occasional bomb raid, and the death of Danzig men who had 
died in combat, the city's Germans experienced little war-related tragedy. Nevertheless, 
Gisela Lehmann wrote that this sense of calm was subordinated to the trauma of her fear 
46 Lewandowska interview. 
47 Tighe, 178-179. . 
29 
ofthe impending doom in store for Danzig: "Until 1944 we were almost totally 
untouched by the bombing attacks on our old historic city. Only at the beginning of 1945 
were we to feel the full impact of the inhuman unavoidable tortures of the war." 
Lehmann also noted that after her grandmother died in 1943, her mother and the priest 
consoling her, "Stayed at our home on long evenings while both him and my mother 
discussed the future and terrible end which was to befall us." 48 Within these sentiments 
is a sense that the war in the east, like the takeover of Danzig itself, was propagated 
solely by Hitler and the Nazis and a prediction that the Germans in Danzig were going to 
suffer as a result ofboth. Lehmann's memories of the war years in Danzig do not 
consider that Germans in the city had allowed the Nazis to inflict suffering upon their 
Polish neighbors. Instead, the trauma of fear that the outcome of the war would surely 
end badly for the innocent Germans of Danzig prevails in her memories. 
48 Lehmann, 1 
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The Refugee City 
With the arrival of the winter of 1944 and the advance of the Red Army through 
East Prussia, Danzig and its then 404,000 citizens had already begun to witness an influx 
of eastern Germans fleeing the approaching eastern front.49 Even before January 1945 
refugees, predominantly from the south ofthe Gau of Danzig-West Prussia, East Prussia 
and the Baltic region began swarming into the city to escape the Soviet invasion. By 
January, Danzig was the main rally point for refugees, fleeing west by land and sea. It 
was a relatively safe position in the crumbling east through the winter and early spring of 
1945, despite the proximity of Danzig to the epicenter of the fighting and had suffered 
inconsistently from bomb raids until that point. Danzig was a place that refugees from 
the east felt they could live in safely or find transportation to interior regions of the 
Reich. Those refugees from other eastern German territories encountered great perils to 
flee to Danzig. Ultimately, tales of suffering by eastern German refugees, especially 
incidents of rape caused the refugees and citizens ofDanzig to take extremely dangerous 
measures in order to escape the city. Like rape, rumors of the perils of evacuation by sea 
proved to be true for many unlucky refugees. On the other hand, most native Danzigers 
remained in the city and by and large made no attempt to leave until almost March, when 
the city's fall was all but imminent. This was the result of continued belief in Hitler and 
the German armies' ability to drive back the Russians. Loss of faith in the war effort and 
in the Nazi superstructure also caused rampant crime, profiteering, and an attempt by 
Germans to distance themselves from their guilt ridden past. 
49 Theodor Schieder ed., Documents on the Expulsion of the Germans From Eastern-Central Europe Vol.! The 
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Statistically speaking, Danzig, Gotenhafen, and the small port ofHela on the 
northeastern tip of the Hela peninsula, were the evacuation points to the west by both 
land and sea for 900,000 refugees in January alone. By May, long after the city had 
fallen, 300,000 additional refugees, wounded soldiers and civilians would leave the port. 
Whether it was known as Danzig or Gdansk, the ports ofthis region evacuated 1,285,000 
approximately, more than any other single city in East or West Prussia, or Pomerania. 5° 
These figures alone demonstrate the importance of Danzig as a rallying point for 
refugees. Furthermore, these statistics suggest that it may have been common knowledge 
among German refugees that Danzig was a safe haven, worth enduring the hardships of 
the Baltic winter and Russian onslaught in an attempt to flee there in January and 
February 1945. It seems that Danzig had reached mythic status for refugees as a safe 
haven amidst the crumbling eastern front. 
This false sense of safety which seemed to exist in Danzig during this time 
among both residents and refugees was promoted by a number of factors. Foremost, was 
the faith in Hitler and the Nazi regime among Germans in the east. Gauleiter Albert 
Forster had ordered the city to begin to reinforce its defenses in November of 1944, 
confidently believing that if worse came to worst he would be able to defend the capital 
of his Gau until Hitler released his "secret weapon" which would drive the Red Army 
back. 51 Hans von Lehndorff, a doctor and surgeon from Allenstein, East Prussia, just east 
ofDanzig appeared also to have been convinced by the idea of Hitler's secret weapon. 
Lehndorffmay have also been specifically influenced by the sadistically loyal Gauleiter 
of East Prussia, Erich Kohl, who preached of a "wonder-weapon" that would save the 
50 Nitschke, 71. 
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Germans of the east. 52 Lehndorffwrote, "The Fuhrer has planned everything up to now 
and must have some definite reason for letting the Russians push so deep into our 
country. "53 
Even though Hitler ordered Forster to hold Danzig to the last man, it would be too 
reductionist to contend that it was merely faith in Hitler and his ability to contrive a 
miracle weapon to repel the Soviets. Likewise, it is difficult to determine how 
widespread among the lay Danzig population the reportedly common belief was which 
asserted that even if Germany lost the war, Danzig would revert immediately to Free 
State status under international protection.54 Eyewitnesses to the events transpiring in the 
city in the winter of 1945 attributed fear of SS retributions for cowardice and non-
compliance in the defense of the east rather than faith in Hitler or post-war international 
intervention by the Allies, as being far more likely causes of this continued sense of 
loyalty towards the Third Reich by the residents of and refugees in Danzig. Lajica 
Lewandowska confirmed this beliefwhen she stated that bodies of Germans hanging 
from trees and lampposts were a common sight as early as January of 1945. This was a 
constant and morbid visual reminder of the fate that awaited Germans who did not remain 
loyal to Hitler. 55 
For Germans outside of Danzig, faith in Hitler and his secret plans of a counter-
strike were quickly replaced by the grim reality of the rapidly approaching Red Army, 
who would pass through their areas first on the way to Danzig. For Lehndorff, any hope 
he had of a secret weapon disappeared with the arrival of the Red Army in Allenstein. 
52 Hans von Lehndorff, Token of a Covenant: Diary of an East Prussian Surgeon, 1945-1947, trans. 
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He reported being woken by a loud noise: "It sounded as if many heavy trucks were 
standing around the building with their motors running uninterruptedly ... this could only 
mean the end." Lehndorff chose to escape north to Konigsberg rather than west to 
Danzig, but described the evacuation from his home as a journey in which he felt that he 
was witnessing "the end of all the places that mattered" to him. Unquestioning faith and 
loyalty to the Fuhrer in the most desperate of situations certainly caused excessive 
suffering and death for Germans at the end of the war. In Lehndorff s case, realization 
that he had been led to believe falsely that Hitler would protect his home is manifested in 
a profound sense of victimization through loss of Heimat. 
The problem for refugees located in the eastern and southern areas of the Gau of 
Danzig-West Prussia was that Soviet military strategy had devised a plan to push towards 
Pomerania from the south, as well as from East Prussia, in an effort to cut off any land 
escape from the Danzig region to the west. The cities south and east of Danzig, such as 
Elbing, Marienwerder, and Marienberg were where the German 2nd Army made a last 
ditch effort to keep the Red Army from driving towards the Pomeranian coast. Many 
Germans in the east must have known that their window of opportunity to escape to the 
west by land was closing fast and that desperate measures were needed in order to get to 
Danzig. The testimony of a Major Janecke of the Wehrmacht Medical Corp, who was 
dispatched from Danzig south to Marienwerder, reported harrowing images of refugees 
bent on escaping by land before it was too late. Janecke wrote, " ... the roads were so 
congested that for a time we tried to make headway across country and along field paths. 
But even there, refugee treks were blocking the way. People of all kinds, on foot, leading 
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fantastic vehicles, stragglers-on in an indescribable ghostly procession."56 Despite 
difficult conditions, endless delays, and disease, refugees located in the south of the Gau 
ofDanzig-West Prussia were willing to endure extreme conditions to escape to the Reich 
by land. 
For Germans in East Prussia, escape by land to Danzig was made even more 
difficult than for their southern counterparts, by virtue ofthe geography of the Baltic 
coast. By the last week in January it was becoming extremely difficult and dangerous for 
refugees from the east Prussian coast to escape by land to Danzig except via the Frisches 
HaJJ, a long strip of land that ran under frozen water parallel to the Prussian Baltic coast, 
followed by the Nehrung road, both east of the city. These were places of memory where 
East Prussian refugees experienced and witnessed great suffering to reach the city. 
Danzig's myth as a safe haven certainly motivated many East Prussian Germans to 
undergo such perils. Lore Ehrich wrote in 1946 and 194 7 as an expellee in West 
Germany, of her experience in escaping East Prussia with her family via the frozen HajJ 
and the Nehrung. She stated, "Danzig was ... the goal laid down for refugees. There we 
were to receive, clothes, coupons, and private billets."57 
It is estimated that over half a million people fled over the icy and treacherous 
Haffto Danzig in late January and early February. 58 The Haffhad been defended 
tenaciously by the remnants of the German 2nd Army in retreat from the south and east. 
Ehrich and her family decided to flee to Danzig from their horne in Sensburg, East 
Prussia after the Red Army arrived on 28 January. Forced to make the journey by night, 
Ehrich, her family, and fellow refugees traversed the HajJ which was lit by flares from 
56 Tighe, 186. 
57 Schieder, 135-142. 
58 Ibid. 
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the Luftwaffe. She described images ofhorses, wagons, and people, who had fallen into 
the ice and frozen. Crossing the HajJ, which is about ten miles long, took two days 
because the refugees had to avoid Russian bombers and fighters who tried to strafe and 
detonate the ice so that it would break. The images of the Haffwould be followed by 
another space of severe traumatic memory right afterwards, the Nehrung road, which 
connected the southern end of the Haffwith Danzig's eastern suburbs. "Oh this awful 
road!" recalled Ehrich as she described the poor conditions, deep mud, frequent halts and 
delays, corpses by the side of the road, and an endless column of refugees. Finally, 
Ehrich and her family reached Dirschau, on the outskirts of Danzig where she had to 
threaten suicide in order to convince an SS officer to feed, clothe, and let her and her 
children bathe, and then get them on a train to the city. 59 
Ehrich's account displays the threshold of suffering many eastern Germans were 
willing to confront and endure to reach Danzig. Rumors of its safety, provisions and 
access to the sea certainly must have contributed to motivating thousands of refugees 
such as Ehrich to go to such extremely dangerous measures such as to travel the HajJ and 
the Nehrung road, as well as to threaten suicide, in order to reach the city. Upon reaching 
Danzig, Ehrich and her family were taken in by relatives for a few weeks before boarding 
a boat for Denmark. As a displaced person, Ehrich found the situation in Danzig at the 
time to be stable and was comforted by the fact that "after all we had been through, the 
few air-raids and the going down into the cellar was a trifle."60 Ehrich's sentiments 
reflected a general trend among both city residents, as well as those who had survived the 
trek to Danzig, that the city was safe for the foreseeable future. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
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A sense of victimization by German refugees runs strongly through statements of 
the pandemonium in trying to escape from Danzig to the west by land. One teacher from 
Zoppot by the name ofllse Kohl made the decision to leave Danzig on New Year's Day. 
Already the scene in and around the city had become chaotic as it took her and her family 
five hours just to get from Zoppot to Danzig Central Station, a train-ride that would 
normally take minutes. Ilse was then put on military transport that went first to 
Gotenhafen and then to Rostock, which took several days instead of several hours, during 
which time she and her family contracted scarlet fever. She wrote, "the guards kept 
saying that it was too dangerous for us to travel, that Polish engine drivers were taking 
trains full of refugees through the lines into the hands of the Russians ... but a soldier near 
me said, 'don't lose your nerve, we are all in the same boat."61 In this passage, a German 
teacher and soldier connect emotionally with each other by focusing on their own 
victimization during the evacuation of a region, where both no doubt had served to 
consolidate the Nazi regime. The memory ofllse and this unnamed, but poignant soldier, 
while being transported find themselves representative of the east where Ilse had likely 
spread and engrained Nazi ideology and where the soldier enforced and fought for it. 
Their memories are also as traumatized refugees, expelled forever from their homes. 
They would serve as the advertisers of a sense of German loss and suffering in the east. 
By late January, it became more and more difficult to escape by land, making 
evacuation by sea the more prevalent means of fleeing the Red Army advance. Tales of 
Soviet acts of reprisal, violence, destruction, rape, and death brought by German refugees 
from the city, motivated thousands to crowd the docks and quays ofDanzig, Gotenhafen, 
and Hela, despite the fact the rumors of Soviet submarine activity in the Bay of Danzig, 
61 Tighe, 181-182. 
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the Baltic and the North Sea were widespread. Fear of the ravages of the Soviet 
onslaught, specifically the Red Army's propensity towards rape motivated thousands to 
pursue the dangerous avenue of evacuation by sea at any cost. The account of Countess 
zu Eulenberg, herself escaping from Neufahrwasser, a Danzig port in the western district 
ofthe city, provides a description ofthe scene on the docks and beaches of the city. On 
the beach through the snow all she could see was a horde of refugees, who had built a 
tent city out of blankets amidst the snow covered sand dunes, desperate to escape the city: 
" ... the crush to get on board was just terrible .. .I saw a pram being squeezed out 
of all recognition by the pushing masses. One man fell into the water and there 
was nothing one could do in the crush ... the Soviet guns and the Stormoviks 
strafed, tearing great holes in the waiting ranks of the refugees. But nobody 
moved, even death was less important than getting on board one of those boats. 
Babies were being used as tickets, being carried on board, and then thrown down 
again to be used as passports ... some fell between the ship and quayside. It 
seemed not to matter ... "62 
The ship for which Eulenberg had witnessed such desperation and sacrifice to 
board was the Wilhelm Gust/off Grand Admiral Donitz ordered several large luxury 
liners to be activated to help get refugees and wounded soldiers back to the Reich on 21 
January 1945, the largest and most well known being the Wilhelm Gust/off, named after a 
Nazi functionary who had been assassinated in Switzerland by David Friedlander, a 
Jewish student.63 Soon after sailing from Gotenhafen, the ship was sunk by a Soviet 
submarine off the Pomeranian coast on 30 January. It is estimated that over 7,000 people 
lost their lives, making it the greatest maritime disaster up to that point. 
Captained by one Friedrich Peterson, the ship set sail poorly equipped for the 
rigors of the winter journey, the capacity of people aboard, and the threat of Soviet 
62 Christopher Dobson eta!., The Cruelest Night, (Toronto: Little, Brown, & Co., 1979), 24-25. 
63 Anthony Beevor, The Fall of Berlin 1945, (NY: Viking Pub., 2002), 51. 
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submarine activity. Donitz ordered the Gustloffbe made seaworthy and capable of 
carrying thousands more than its original 1,465 passenger and 400 crew capacity 
although the dangers of such an evacuation along the Pomeranian coast were known. 
The ship left the docks with the escort ships Hansa, Hamburg and Deutschland on 30 
January. The final passenger list aboard the Gust/off was 918 naval officers and men, 
173 crew, 373 Women's Naval Auxiliaries, 162 wounded, and 4,424 refugees. While it 
is known that a large percentage of the refugees on board hailed from various locations in 
and nearby the Gau of Danzig-West Prussia, specific figures of how many actually were 
on the ship when it sank remain hazy because it stopped at Hela before setting out into 
the Baltic, to pick up approximately a thousand more refugees.64 Donitz and the staff 
who helped him plan the operation had little choice in planning the ship's navigational 
route, other than to hug the coast, as the deeper waters were strewn with mines, yet the 
planning team failed to arm the Gust/off or its escort ships or adequately equip her with 
enough emergency life boats and preserves for all on board. 65 Poor planning of the 
mission put pressure on the crew of the ship to perform and execute precisely in the event 
of an emergency situation. 66 
Alexander Marinesko, the commander of the Soviet S-13 submarine, is the Soviet 
captain credited with sinking the Gust/off Marinesko's documented actions during the 
sinking ofthe ship, as well as his own memory ofthe hunt for the Gust/off display hate 
for the Germans. While the ship was carrying German military personnel, thus making it 
a legitimate target, sinking the Gust/off and killing innocent civilians was for Marinesko 
more than a mere assignment to destroy any ship suspected of coming to supply or 
64 Dobson et all, 83-84. 
65 Ibid, 83-84 
66 Ibid, 67-70. 
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leaving to evacuate the pocket of German troops holding out in the east. The Soviet 
literary journal Zvezda published Marinesko's war time experiences several years later. 
Marinesko wrote, "We were prowling up and down the fascist lair. But the dogs 
wouldn't come out and fight. I decided that next day I would take the war to them, get a 
fix on the Hela lighthouse and sneak into the Danzig Bay itself. .. "67 Marinesko had a 
reputation for being a heavy drinker when on land, but a sober minded, ruthless, and loyal 
Soviet comrade when at sea, who hated all Germans and the suffering their armies had 
brought upon the Soviet Union. It took the S-13 about two hours to catch up with the 
Gustloff, undetected as the ship's radar had frozen. As the Gustloffreached the waters 
near the Stolp Bank, the S-13 fired three bow torpedoes on the boat's port side, all of 
which found their mark. Reportedly, Marinesko ordered that the submarine stay, so that 
he could watch the ship sink, despite the fact that he knew the Kriegsmarine would soon 
send re-enforcements, a decision which no doubt put his submarine and its crew in 
jeopardy. Marinesko later torpedoed the Steuben, claiming another 3,000 wounded and 
terrified Germans from the east. The man himself is responsible for the deaths of around 
10,000 Germans.68 Marinesko's actions, when juxtaposed with his statement above, 
certainly suggest a vendetta he felt he was enacting against the Third Reich and Germans 
from the east. He expresses a general sentiment branded into the Soviet officer corps 
which saw all Germans as "fascist dogs," who needed to feel the ravages of war brought 
upon their soil and seas, just as Soviet memory experienced during the German invasion 
of the U.S.S.R earlier in the war. 
67 Ibid, 93. 
68 Ibid, 98-101. 
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While Marinesko's memory of the sinking of the Gust/off seemed to focus on a 
vendetta for Soviet victimhood, German memory of the events at sea that night display a 
sense of German victimhood, which completely ignored Soviet suffering. After the 
explosions, the scene onboard the Gustloffmust have been one of pure panic and 
pandemonium, in total darkness and windy minus eighteen-degrees Fahrenheit weather. 
Many survivors reported that the ship's crew, rather than try and save peoples' lives, 
caused more to drown through ineptness in handling an emergency situation, as well as 
through their own sense of self-preservation. The first thing Captain Peterson ordered 
was to try and seal up the ship's leakage compartments. This trapped wounded soldiers 
and refugees below deck to drown. After failing to seal up the gashes in the ship's side, 
Peterson himself escaped to a lifeboat. Many of the ship's crew immediately decided to 
shirk their duties and jump aboard lifeboats to save themselves, even though an order had 
been issued to allow women and children to board the lifeboats first. Reportedly, one 
lifeboat that could have held fifty, hit the water with twelve sailors.69 There were also 
reports of armed sailors aboard lifeboats who clubbed or shot at swimmers trying to 
board their boats, for fear they would capsize or tip. The Admiral Hipper responded to 
the Gust/off's SOS signal, itselftransporting 1,377 refugees and 152 dock workers to 
Kiel. At the last minute, the Hipper's captain received word that Soviet submarine 
activity was still threatening the scene of the sinking Gust/off The ship pressed onwards, 
causing many who were still alive in the water, to drown in its wake. 70 
German memory of the sinking Gust/off recalled that for many, suicide was 
preferable to drowning or freezing to death. Heinz Schoen, who interviewed survivors of 
69 Ibid, 105-111. 
70 Ibid, 123-124. 
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the disaster after the war in West Germany, spoke to a sailor who had run below deck to 
try and save those who were trapped. He un-jammed a door, to hear a pistol shot and 
discovered, " ... on the floor lay the bodies of a woman and a small child. In the center of 
the cabin was a naval officer holding a still smoking pistol while a terrified five-year old 
clutched his father's leg ... (I) had interrupted on a family suicide pact."71 Other 
methods of suicide on board the sinking ship were recorded by Schoen. Engineer Officer 
Walter Knust stated that the deck of the boat was very icy and many stumbled and slid 
off the sides. Since it had been so hot below deck, the shock of coming outside to such 
cold conditions, often severely underclothed, caused many people who jumped or fell 
into the water to die on contact.72 Knust wrote that many who were aware of the deadly 
frigid conditions outside used the elements instead of a pistol to commit suicide: "When 
we got to the boat deck it was swarming with passengers. I saw some of them even take 
off their clothes before they plunged into the water and they must have died at once."73 
Descriptions and memory of the Gust/off's final moments also display a sense of 
German victimhood. The ship took just over an hour to sink and at the last minute an 
explosion in the engine room knocked the lights on the ship back on.74 Witnesses 
described the scene as a fully lit ship, shining onto a sea of frozen bodies floating in the 
water, mixed with screaming ofthose struggling on the surface who hadn't succumbed to 
hypothermia. Both Dobson and the other authors of The Cruelest Night, as well as 
Gunter Grass have speculated that the image of the brightly lit Wilhelm Gust/off sinking 
into the Baltic amidst the screams of German victims is a metaphor for the ultimate 
71 Ibid, 111. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid, 112-115. 
74 Ibid, 120 
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failure and downfall of the Third Reich at large. These authors also note in their 
respective works on the topic of the memory of the sinking Gustloffthat after the German 
U-boat T -36 surfaced to pick up survivors, sailors on board helped deliver several babies 
of pregnant women who had survived the sinking of the ship.75 German memory has 
highlighted this phenomenon ofthe survival of these newborns as symbolic ofthe 
inheritance of victimization in which they were the ultimate survivors of the Gustloffwho 
would carry on the memory of the German maritime disaster at the war's end. While it is 
not known exactly how many people perished, it is know that 964 were defiantly saved, 
including these newborns. 76 These survivors, who were both directly and indirectly 
victimized by this tragedy, would take their memories of the Gust! off and recreate it for 
German post-war memory at large, without considering why the ship was torpedoed. 
The case of the Wilhelm Gustloffis an instance where both Soviet and German 
memory of the war would focus on their own respective victimization. For Marinesko, 
sinking this ship was a way to achieve both a military objective, as well as fulfill a 
national agenda of Soviet retribution for the German war crimes in the U.S.S.R. 
Marinesko probably would not even have been in the position as the captain of the 
submarine, had he not possessed the nerve to order the torpedoing of a ship where 
thousands of innocent civilians would die. Likewise, it would be equally unthinkable to 
expect a German refugee aboard the sinking Gustloff, witnessing all the horrors disaster 
around them, to stop and consider that the root cause of such a tragedy stemmed from 
Soviet suffering, inflicted by Germans. Yet, post-war memory of this event by both the 
75 Ibid, 123-129. 
76 Ibid, 140. 
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Soviet perpetrators and Germans victims forget that the Soviet Union had also been a 
victim and Germany a perpetrator of equally reprehensible war crimes. 
Following the Wilhelm Gustlofftragedy, Nazi high command decided to 
discontinue any further evacuations on the 1 February, officially denying Danzig's 
already bulging refugee population an option for escape. Danzig's population fluctuated 
so much that any estimate during these days is bound to be skewed. However, refugees 
continued to pour into the city by the thousands. Historians estimate that by 8 February, 
there were 35,000-40,000 refugees in the city, two days later this figure jumped to 
approximately 400,000.77 By mid-February, it has been estimated, 1 to 2 million 
permanent residents and displaced persons were in Danzig.78 Hitler's edict to suspend 
further evacuations trapped many refugees in the city. Those refugees who were 
temporarily living in Danzig or awaiting departure must have interpreted Hitler's 
decision as a sign that the front had stabilized. This belief was in addition to the fact that 
even in February, Danzig was still certainly a safe haven in war tom Prussia by any 
standards. 79 
The decision making of the Fuhrer was no doubt highly compromised by 
dementia, stubbornness, and pride, especially when it came to Danzig, a place which he 
had gone to great lengths to bring back to Germany. The extent to which Hitler was in 
complete denial of the situation in the city is illustrated by the decision he made in mid-
February. He had already decided that all naval construction and testing in the bay had 
become useless and ordered submarine units around Danzig to be evacuated immediately 
to Liibeck. Yet, he had not officially reactivated refugee evacuation from the Baltic. 
77 Beevor, 49. 
78 Tighe, 93. 
79 Schieder, 39. 
44 
Koslin, in Pomerania fell on 7 March, officially closing the pocket and making all land 
escape from East of West Prussia completely impossible.80 Only then did Hitler order 
that Danzig's "Target Sanctuary" would be Copenhagen, Denmark.81 Hitler had refused 
to accept the dire situation there and only ordered the Luftwaffe to drop supplies 
minimally, which in many instances were looted by German soldiers. 82 
In order to promote survival, or to salvage something positive from the dire 
situation in Danzig, many individuals from across the spectrum ofthe German military 
and civilian sector, defied Hitler's orders and edicts. Refugees who had fervently 
believed in Hitler and his ability to repel the Red Army, seemed convinced at the war's 
end, whether by tales of trauma on land or sea at the hands of the Soviets, that Danzig's 
fate was sealed. Hitler's decision to halt all further evacuations was ignored by both the 
military leadership and the people trying to flee the city. The Kriegsmarine launched 
Operation Sonnenwende on 16 February in an attempt to rescue all wounded soldiers, 
refugees, and residents from the city in one fell swoop. On 21 February, 51,000 
reportedly left the city.83 
Realization of the city's fate, through traumatic events can be interpreted in two 
ways. First, it may be an expression of individual survival and profiteering motives, 
which are often related. People crowded the docks ofDanzig, dressing as pregnant 
women, borrowing other peoples' babies, inflicting wounds on themselves, threatening 
suicide, or committing whatever extreme measure it took to get on board a boat. At the 
same time crime was rampant in Danzig. City officials, who were busy building defenses 
80Tighe, 184-185. 
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and devoting manpower to slowing down the Red Army advance, were no longer able to 
prevent widespread corruption, looting, and the emergence of a vibrant black market. 84 
The SS were on patrol with vigilance, willing to execute anyone who did bravely assume 
a role in helping to defend Danzig. Nonetheless, an overall decrease in authority and an 
increase in the overall awareness of the traumatic future that Danzig would eventually 
experience, resulted in a mentality of deterministic individualism, manifesting itself in 
extreme self-preservation and/or individual opportunism. 
Second, defiance ofNazi laws, edicts, and behavior by Germans at the end of the 
war may be indicative of a mindset which sought to distance Danzig and its people from 
. 
Hitler, Nazism, and overall guilt in the last months ofthe city's existence. Hans von 
Lehndorffhad already witnessed this dynamic at his new post at a hospital in Insterburg 
where a nurse under him interpreted the advance of the Russians as holding at least one 
positive outcome. She assumed that all high ranking Nazis would probably fly away 
beforehand: "Thank God, we are rid ofthem! At least we can breathe freely!"85 This 
woman clearly did not hold the Nazis in high regard anymore and that they were a 
foreign entity who would not be missed. Prior to the Russian ransacking of his hospital 
in late March, Lehndorff reported that all his co-workers had begun to prepare for the 
inevitable. "On a table in their dining room stood a photograph of Churchill and 
everybody was busy learning Russian words of welcome."86 
Danzigers as well as lay Germans who were not native to the city seemed to show 
a specific resentment at the war's end for Nazi leadership. The testimony of Hans 
Gliewe, a refugee from Stolp in Pomerania, who had fled to Danzig, described trying in 
84 Tighe, 188. 
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vain to find a shelter during an air raid: "We went from door to door looking for a place. 
Many people slammed the door in our faces when they heard we were from old German 
territory. They called us Nazis and blamed us for everything that had happened to 
Danzig."87 By singling out a Reichsdeutsche (Germans who had been born in or who had 
citizenship of Germany proper) such as Gliewe, Danzigers at the last minute had decided 
that they had never been part of the foreign German sphere in the first place and that 
being invaded and annexed in 1939 was something Germany forced upon Danzig. Denial 
of protection for people from outside Danzig and placing the burden of guilt upon their 
shoulders at the last minute may have been motivated by traumatic memory as well. By 
early March, reports, rumors, and eyewitnesses had appraised almost everyone in Danzig 
of the level of anti-German ferocity that should be expected, should the city fall. Fear of 
these reprisals ultimately had to have been the most significant factor for this last minute 
switch of allegiances, denial of guilt, and hostility towards the Nazi superstructure and its 
perceived agents. 
The sinking ofthe Wilhelm Gust/off seems to be the most prominent military 
event in Danzig history and memory during the early months of 1945. Yet, one of the 
world's worst maritime disasters to date is relatively unknown and forgotten outside of 
German history and memory. Gunter Grass reminded the world of the events in his 2001 
novella Im Krebs gang, (Crabwalk). Although fictitious, it is a formulation of Grass's 
version ofthe events while finding a way to couch them into three generations of German 
history, as witnessed by survivors of the sinking ship and their descendents. Using the 
Danzig tragedy ofthe torpedoing ofthe Gustloffand its meaning for German memory, 
87 Tighe, 187. 
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Grass's most recent work questions the evolution of this memory. In the process, Grass 
is critical ofways in which historians revisit and report events such as the sinking ofthis 
ship so symbolic to the victimization ofDanzig's Germans. In Im Krebsgang, Grass goes 
well beyond the sinking of the Gust/off, using this tragedy as a platform by which to 
expose the hermeneutical problems of German history and memory fifty years after the 
events outside Danzig. 
Im Krebsgang is the story ofPaul Pokriefke, a journalist born the night the 
Gust/off sank. His mother Tulia was one of the pregnant women rescued who 
subsequently gave birth that night. Paul, representative of the 1960s generation of West-
Germans that had rejected notions of German victimhood, had always been uninterested 
in his mother's victimization embodied in survivor culture, history, or memory passed 
down about the tragedy. Paul's son Konrad however becomes very interested in the 
topic, via the internet. Konrad creates a website and subsequently becomes obsessed 
with the assassination of Wilhelm Gustloffby the Jewish student activist David 
Friedlander. Konrad embodies the third generation of inherited German victimhood, 
continuing the memory of the tragedy. Paul, who was divorced and did not live with 
Konrad, can only watch as his son moves towards extreme right wing politics. Konrad 
uses his computer as both a research tool and an information and media outlet, all the 
while encouraged by Tulia's insistence that the memories of her experience not 
disappear. Konrad meets a fellow virtual historian in an internet chatroom who claims to 
be Jewish and is researching Friedlander. After weeks of debating each other over the 
internet on the merits of German perpetration versus Jewish victimhood, the two decide 
to meet face to face, where Konrad premeditatedly shoots and kills the other boy. In 
48 
admitting his crime Konrad claimed to be revenging the assassination of Gustloff fifty 
years earlier. During Konrad's incarceration, Paul discovers that a website exists 
honoring Konrad's act and martyring his imprisonment. Like the sinking of the Gust/off, 
Konrad himself has become a part of the canon of German suffering and memory. The 
final words of the book ominously read," It doesn't end. Never will it end."88 
First and foremost the title of the book, Im Krebsgang can be interpreted as a 
metaphor for doing any form of historical research and remembrance for a tragedy such 
as the sinking of the Wilhelm Gust/off The last months of the war were highly confusing, 
complex, and controversial times to examine as they are possessed by multiple versions 
of German, Polish, Soviet and Jewish traumatic memory.89 Grass sums up the process 
his protagonist Paul must face in working through the memory of the events of his son's 
troubled life, his life, and the historical event of the sinking Gust/off 
"Ifi really have to settle my own historical accounts now, everything I messed up 
is going to be ascribed to the sinking of a ship .. . But I'm still not sure how to go 
about this: should I do as I was taught and unpack one life at a time, in order or do 
I have to sneak up on time in a crabwalk, seeming to go backward but actually a 
scuttling sideways, and thereby working my way forward fairly rapidly"90 
As crabs walk sideways, Grass is commenting on the various angles one could approach 
and work through such topics, considering different versions of memory, from different 
time periods, held by various ethnic groups, each claiming a different memory of this 
incident.91 Grass, through his protagonist, is assuming the role of the historian and brings 
the methodology of research and scholarship, and the process of secondary memory into 
question. 
88 Gunter Grass, Crabwalk, trans. by Krishna Winston, (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Inc. 2001), 234. 
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Grass's imagery of the ways in which the right-wing had warped the memory of 
German victimization after the war portrays computer savvy skinheads debating in virtual 
reality. Paul begins to suspect his son's involvement in right wing political debate when 
he visits a neo-Nazi webpage and reads the debates that ensued in the site's chat-room. 
He views statements which seemed to reclaim or warp history: "more ludicrous than 
disgusting." Paul narrates that, "Soon battles raged between the right and left wings of 
the chatters. A virtual Night of the Long Knives took its toll."92 
As Paul investigates his son's online activities, the protagonist is reminded how as 
a child, Tulia had tried to force him into the role of a historian and receptacle of the 
secondary memory of his mother's trauma. Paul also had to inherit a memory which his 
mother did not herself witness, but heard about afterwards, such as the particularly 
gruesome death of the Naval Auxiliary girls sleeping in the dry pool on the ship. As he 
narrates; "Because I have known, ever since the childhood my mother imposed on me, 
that the second torpedo struck the swimming pool and transformed its tiles and pieces of 
mosaic into deadly missiles ... "93 Visual imagery of a scene so terrible seems to have 
caused Tulia to empathize with these particular victims within her own tragedy. Her own 
experience was so traumatic, that she assumed the role of an eye-witness because of this 
empathy. Paul, as the token fact gatherer, had to work through and live with such 
memories from this complex perspective. The role of the historian, which the neo-Nazis 
on the website had hijacked, was one which Paul had rejected all his life but was forced 
to assume in order to save his son's inherited memory. 
92 Grass, Crabwalk, 3-5 
93 Ibid, 61. 
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Grass levels a great deal of criticism at the right-wing and their incomplete and 
one-sided historical remembrance of German victimhood. At one point in the novel, Paul 
tries to approach Konrad when he had proof of his son's involvement in right wing 
activism. His son replied, "I'm doing historical research."94 For Grass, the role of a 
historian of German suffering in Crabwalk, as in post war Germany had been 
championed by right wing revanchism, arm chair historians, and troubled teenagers 
searching for identity on the internet-all of whom had attached themselves to the memory 
of German victimization during the war's end. Grass uses Konrad's sudden interest in 
the trauma Grandma Tulia experienced, as an example of this version of history which 
only focuses on crimes against Germans and not their guilt. Proper scholarship which 
had worked through the event of 30 January 1945 would have considered that in many 
ways German crimes had indirectly caused the Gustloffto be torpedoed and sunk.95 
In Im Krebs gang, Grass specifically addresses the shortcomings of Christopher 
Dobson's, John Miller's, and Ronald Payne's study of the Gustlofftragedy: The Cruelest 
Night. This study was written by a group of British historians in 1979, twenty-two years 
prior to the publication of Im Krebs gang. These historians were perhaps motivated by 
the lack of serious study on the topic, and decided to take Schoen's interviews, 
documents available from both Berlin and Moscow, as well as other accounts and write 
the first complete secondary history ofthe tragedy. On the Cruelest Night, Grass 
comments that," .. . written by three Englishmen. But even this documentation of the 
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catastrophe, which I must admit was written factually but too emotionlessly .. .It's all too 
impersonal; nothing comes from the heart."96 
Grass's assessment of the The Cruelest Night, though a good secondary source 
full of factual names, dates, statistics, and descriptions, focuses on its overall banal, 
matter-of-factually, stoic, and at times boring history of the sinking of the Gust/off For 
instance, the authors of The Cruelest Night spend some time working through the 
question ofwhether the torpedoing ofthe Gustloffcould be considered a war crime. 
Although the study takes no clear stand on the question, it does point out and seems to 
agree with the findings of an investigation conducted by the Institut fiir Seerecht in Kiel 
after the war. The Institute had concluded that the hundreds of naval submarine 
specialists on board, as well as the non-registration of the Wilhelm Gust/off as a hospital 
ship made it a viable target for Marinesko.97 
The idea of deserved death or historical justice against the Germans, as no doubt 
propagated by Marinesko and Soviet memory of World War II, would be very difficult to 
substantiate on a moral or logical level. To invoke a "serves them right" polemic, in the 
context of correct military behavior is too reductionist and does not properly work 
through the idea of comparing German losses with Soviet losses, both as a result of the 
war. Grass's historiographical comment and stylistic critique of Dobson, Miller, and 
Payne's work can be interpreted as a critique of traumatic history at large. Furthermore, 
Im Krebsgang is a general criticism of the ways in which historians have assumed the 
duties of reporting on and the format in which they present topics such as the sinking of 
the Gust/off, and other multi-layered traumatic memories. 
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Another issue within the context of researching the Gustlofftragedy and German 
suffering that Grass pokes fun at is the use of accuracy of statistics, specifically death 
rates, and survival rates in setting the parameters of victimhood. Paul recalled 
that," ... Mother really had no idea by whom she was pregnant when she set out on the 
morning of January 30th 1945 with her parents, leaving Gotenhafen/Oxoft pier as 
passenger number seven thousand such-and-such."98 Priority of memory is being 
analyzed here by Grass in terms of whether the memories of where and when Tulia 
boarded the ship are reliable or even important. This is juxtaposed with who Paul's real 
fathers is, which nobody knows to this day and are ultimately moot points. Grass also 
paints a scene of the docks near the Gustloff as being completely chaotic and any registry 
of those boarding was bound to be skewed. "You wouldn't believe the pushing and 
shoving, total confusion. In the beginning they were keeping a neat list-everyone who 
came up the gangway-but even the paper ran out. .. "99 For Grass, "numbers are never 
accurate, in the end you always have to guess .. .it didn't matter and it still doesn't."100 
In Im Krebs gang, Grass raises a number of general questions pertaining to the 
role, reliability and shortcomings of the historian/fact finder of victimhood and traumatic 
memory. Why remember the Gustloffwithin the context of the trauma during the end of 
the war brought upon the city of Danzig and its population? Is this tragedy significantly 
part ofDanzig history? Konrad Pokriefke felt that as the agent of historical reportage, 
"any strand of the plot having to do directly or loosely with victimization of Germans 
fleeing from the city of Danzig and its environs should be (his) concern."101 According 
98 Grass, Crabwalk, 18. 
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to Grass, German memory through research and recreation of victimization symbolized 
by a maritime disaster is inherently flawed. That to research traumatic events at the war's 
end, no matter how disconnected to these events Germans actually were, they could not 
help but possess a sole version of that memory, which denied Soviet, Polish, or Jewish 
suffering. 
54 
The Destruction of Danzig 
As March of 1945 began, the citizens of Danzig were preparing to witness war 
directly for the first time in the city's modem history as the Soviet 1st and 2nd Armies 
pushed eastward and northward from Pomerania and Elbing respectively. By then, 
Danzig bulged with refugees and wounded soldiers from the east, each with their 
traumatic memories ofRussian assaults in other eastern German territories. The 
memories ofDanzig Germans of these final days ofthe city's existence would focus on 
their own victimization. This victimization was manifested through stories of rape, 
murder, robbery, and destruction which saturated the city, causing a pre-traumatic terror 
syndrome to occur before the Russian armies approached. As the Red Army closed in on 
Danzig and its suburbs, the Germans in Danzig displayed reticence both to defend their 
city, as well as to carry out the scorched-earth policy demanded by Hitler for 
Gotenhafen/Gdynia in the face of certain defeat. Danzigers' sense of wartime 
victimization was confirmed with the appearance of Russian troops in the city. Upon 
taking the city, the Red Army brought the rumors of their terror to life in the streets and 
basements of the city. The Russians would force Danzigers to witness the destruction of 
their city as an object lesson for their co-operation and support of Hitler. However, the 
German authors ofthe statements and documents from the fall ofDanzig, as a whole 
neglect their own participation in the Nazi regime in favor of a memory which made 
Danzigers the victims ofthe end of World War II. Additionally, Poles who still remained 
in the city experienced the ferocity of the Russian siege in much the same way as their 
German counterparts. In Danzig, memories of the destruction of the city would manifest 
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themselves through Christian martyrdom at the hands of the atheistic Soviets. 
Ultimately, the memory of destruction, violence, and rape during the last month of the 
city's existence as Danzig heralded its final hours and define those who suffered through 
it. 
All winter long Danzig stood in relative safety, but it had been flooded with 
refugees from East Prussia and the Baltic states fleeing the invasion of the Red Army. 
Even before there was any real Soviet military threat to the immediate Danzig region, the 
residents, refugees and displaced persons in the city began reacting to the impending loss 
of the war with apprehension and fear. One might call it a pre-traumatic stress syndrome, 
which military psychologist Philip Zimbardo describes, "that prolonged state of worry 
about one's vulnerability without any clear action to alter it can have a profoundly 
negative impact on our individual and collective mental health."102 This appeared to be 
the case in Danzig, particularly in preparing a defense of the city. 
Under these conditions, German authorities, including Gauleiter Albert Forster 
and General von Saucker, who was given authority over Forster in the task of defending 
Danzig, found widespread popular resistance to their demands that the city's current 
population of a million-and-half people participate in the defense. When the mobilization 
ofDanzig's Volkssturm units began, city authorities found widespread reluctance to 
volunteer. Although the Elbing Volkssturm had been tenacious in the defense of that 
town, Danzigers seemed reluctant to participate voluntarily. Ads in the Danziger 
Vorposten newspaper on 8 March asked all former officers or men with any military 
experience to join their local units, as the city did not have sufficient volunteers to even 
102 Philip Zimbardo, "The Political Psychology of Terrorist Alarms," American Psychological Association 
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attempt a defense against the Red Army. 103 This refusal may have been indicative of a 
general resistance toward defending an indefensible military strongpoint as well as an 
attempt by Danzigers to distance themselves from the Nazis at the last moment. 
Danzigers' separation from the Nazi cause gained powerful re-enforcement after 
Nazi officials responded to popular reticence to defend their city from Soviet invasion by 
forcing Danzig's male residents to participate or die. Although most of Danzig's 91h SS 
Police Division had been evacuated to defend Berlin, Forster held onto 450 ofthese 
diehard Nazis, who went door to door pressing men and boys of all ages into service, 
shooting or hanging all who disobeyed. Most victims of this form of German suffering, 
as a direct result ofNazism, were males, some as young as fourteen or as old as eighty, 
many ofwhom were reportedly just going home to eat. 104 The SS in Danzig established a 
makeshift tribunal in the Central Railway Station and often hung those found guilty from 
trees on prominent streets. One famous anonymously taken photo shows several men 
hanging in Danzig's Hindenburg Allee, with cards around their necks which read, "I hang 
here because I left my unit;" "I betrayed the Fatherland;" or "I am a cowardly traitor."105 
Such arbitrary violence undoubtedly reinforced some Danzigers' perceptions that they 
were victims rather than participants in the German war effort. Lajica Lewandowska, 
who claimed to have seen many such bodies, marked as traitors, hanging from trees of 
various streets since January, remarked feeling sorry for the Germans, even though she 
and her family had been repressed by them. 106 Even after the war, when Lewandowska 
recalled seeing German soldiers who had been captured and being marched away she 
103 David Yelton, Hitler's Volkssturm: The Nazi Militia and Fall of Germany, 1944-1945, (Lawrence, KS: 
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stated, " .. .it was kind of saddening, I felt empathy for them, they were a very proud race, 
they weren't sulking, they marched, they sang. They were still proud."107 For 
Lewandowska, witnessing the suffering of German Danzigers, that was reminiscent of 
the ways she, her family, and other Poles had suffered for the last decade, caused her to 
see her oppressors as fellow victims. 
In neighboring Zoppot, this new sense of the Vistula Delta-Germans' sense of 
victimization sometimes gave way to confusion and tragically desperate solutions. As the 
Red Army advanced down the beach through Zoppot, General Rokossovsky had decided 
to drop leaflets all over the city to warn residents not to resist the Soviet invasion. In 
response, Hitler decided to also canvas the city with leaflets, which described Russian 
atrocities in detail and urged their readers to defend Danzig to the last. The most direct 
result of this competition for the cooperation of the city's citizens, through the saturation 
by leaflets, was high suicide rates in the month of March, particularly, though not 
surprisingly, among women. 108 
Animosity towards Poles and memory of the pre-war economic rivalry between 
the Free City of Danzig and Polish Gdynia dictated a different Nazi response to the 
Soviet advance on the port of Gotenhafen, a response which ultimately evoked feelings of 
victimization, even in those directly responsible for the war's violence. In this part of the 
greater Danzig region, German colonists and refugees who remained appeared not 
initially to have fallen in to the growing sense of victimization that marked the German 
inhabitants of both Danzig and Elbing. On 19 March, as the Red Army began its push 
upon the port city's suburbs shelling the main market in Gotenhafen, reportedly causing a 
107 Ibid. 
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stampede of livestock throughout the city. The Germans who had not fled Gotenhafen 
knew that the city would certainly fall and proceeded to destroy as much of the city and 
the port as possible, so that it would not fall into the hands of the Soviets and to derail 
any future Polish rebuilding projects of the city.109 As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
Gotenhafen had been heavily germanized after the Nazi takeover of the former Polish 
Corridor, when ethnic Germans had been resettled into the former Polish port city of 
Gdynia. Although, most of the city's new residents therefore undoubtedly had little or no 
direct recollection of or relationship with the ways the interwar Polish government had 
used the city of Gdynia to compete against and surpass Danzig in economic prosperity, 
inherited memory infused with hatred for the Poles and their inter-war existence, spurred 
the city's residents to submit to Nazi orders to destroy Gotenhafen before it finally fell on 
26 March. The Germans in Gotenhafen made a decision to perpetrate a vendetta-laden 
scorched-earth policy, designed to effect negatively Russian invasion efforts and future 
Polish rebuilding efforts. This decision indicates that not all of the Danzig region's 
German inhabitants submitted to either pre-traumatic stress syndrome or to feelings of 
victimization and therefore separation from the Nazi war effort. 
Nonetheless, some who witnessed the destruction of Gotenhafen displayed a 
memory of the events which focused not on German retribution or perpetration of 
destruction and trauma but instead exclusively on German suffering. These witnesses, as 
a result, tended to further German ideas that they, no matter their ideological persuasions, 
had become the war's victims rather than its perpetrators and beneficiaries. A soldier 
retreating from Memel, who had participated in the scorched-earth policy in Gotenhafen, 
witnessed the birth of a child amidst the fire and explosions. He wrote, "If the birth of a 
109 Ibid. 
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child is usually a joyful event, this particular birth only seemed to add to the general 
tragedy, the mother's screams no longer had any meaning in a world of screams, and the 
wailing child seemed to regret the beginning of its life."110 It is not unlikely that this 
soldier participated in other traumatic activities on the eastern front, as well as in the 
senseless destruction of a place which symbolized modern Polish economic prosperity 
and success. Yet, his concern at the time was for the tragedy inherent in the birth of a 
German baby, born in the midst of a battle zone and not for the trauma caused by the 
torching of Gotenhafen. The fact that the soldier has dubbed the place in which this baby 
has born as a "world of screams" underlines how even those responsible for the city's 
destruction saw themselves as victims of the city's incineration. 
German Danzigers' sense of victimization grew during this last week of March as 
the Red Army began bombing, shelling, and employing other methods to weaken the city 
center's defenses and the morale of its citizens. As residents sought refuge in basements 
and air-raid shelters, a culture of terror emerged, even before those in cellars encountered 
Russian soldiers, which reinforced feelings of victimhood. While air raids had occurred 
in the city every night during the month of March, the night ofthe twenty-fifth was 
reportedly the worst in terms of Russian shelling and other methods of weakening the 
defense ofthe city and the morale of its residents. That night, the old wooden and half-
timber buildings in Danzig's historic city center burned like kindling wood according to 
eyewitness testimony. One witness now saw the basement shelters as death traps, 
emphasizing: "We had to get out of the cellar because our house was on fire and we 
thought we would get crushed or burnt. We didn't want to get caught. When we got into 
110Quoted in Beevor, 121. 
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the open air we saw that everything was burning and the smoke nearly choked us." 111 
Gisela Lehmann, in contrast, described being forced into a cellar by the fires caused by 
the Russian siege. Her family's home had been destroyed in early March by Soviet 
shelling and as a result they had been living in someone's basement all month. Lehmann 
also recounted how the crowded basements appeared increasingly dangerous as the city 
burned: "We stayed there without interruption day and night and languished while being 
fired on constantly, in fear that we would almost be buried by the debris of the house 
above us. My younger siblings almost had to lie on top of each other in the cold 
basement since the few remaining houses were protecting thousands ofpeople."112 Fires 
had forced Gisela Lehmann, her brother Siegfried, as well as their mother and friends into 
crowded basements that became fire traps in the midst of Russian invasion. 
The parameters of fear and terror expanded when news reached basements that 
the Russian infantry had arrived. News of their arrival was especially harrowing to 
women of all ages who had heard rumors about how German women had suffered greatly 
at the hands of the Red Army in the east. Danzig women had been made privy to other 
refugee's tales of the Red Army's reputation for robbery and for sexual violence and soon 
realized they would become the war's next victims. Gisela Lehmann recalled that below 
ground, "The news came that Russians had reached us .... The entire population inside the 
basement moved ever closer together and since they were only women and screaming 
children, this was a terrible sight to behold."113 Gisela recalled that after the Russians 
had killed the German soldiers assigned to defend their basement, they immediately 
grabbed the women and girls and began raping them. Gisela's mother, who was pregnant 
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at the time, was also not spared this trauma even though she refused and fought against 
them, capitulating only when the Russians threatened to shoot her and her children. 114 
Anna Schwartz similarly remembered the sexual violence associated with the Red 
Army's arrival in Danzig. On 29 March 1945, the day Danzig fell, she, like most others 
had been living in an air-raid shelter "in fear of the future." Schwartz and the others in 
the air-raid shelter knew that although Russian firing and bombing of the city had ceased 
above ground, Red Army troops and tanks were proceeding through the streets of Danzig, 
killing, raping, and robbing. As Russian tanks drove around town with soldiers 
demanding that all Danzigers surrender through loudspeakers as Strauss waltzes playing 
in the background, Red Army soldiers who smelled of alcohol entered Schwartz's cellar 
calling "Urr! Urr!" and hastily robbed her. Fifteen minutes later another group of 
soldiers robbed her again. " ... Meanwhile we heard the shrieks of women, who were 
being raped," she recounted. Ordered out of cellar by the Russians, and robbed once 
more, Schwartz, as she proceeded out into the street, noted how Soviet soldiers were now 
using the remnants of shelled buildings to take women captive and to rape them: "Paying 
no heed to death around us, we went past burning houses, Russian tanks, guns, and 
soldiers who absolutely wanted to drag us into the houses." 115 
Soviet rape in Danzig was blind towards ethnicity and this blindness undoubtedly 
brought many German victims closer to the Poles they had formerly repressed, thereby 
increasing their sense of war-time victimization. Gerhard Nitschke, a Danzig Pole, who 
had witnessed and experienced Soviet violence more directly than Lewandowska during 
the siege of the city, described a 29 March rape and murder of his cousin in a basement 
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by a Soviet soldier: "scenes took place, which we already knew out of many other 
reports : looting, robbery of watches and jewelry and rape of almost all women, who were 
hauled up into the dwelling. For us, who were at the time still unsuspecting children, 
these were traumatic incidents; as result ofthe many rapes my fifteen-year-old [female] 
cousin is dead." 116 Lajica Lewandowska, was lucky enough to have had fled Danzig 
prior to the Soviet invasion, escaping to a farmhouse near Putzig, well north of the city 
but experienced the suffering ofthe indiscriminate rape of Polish women vicariously. 
She recalled that after the war when Poles from Gdansk reunited, they often asked one 
another questions such as "how many Russians raped you?"117 When we consider the 
accounts from Schwartz, Nitschke, Lehmann and Lewandowska we can conclude that 
rape was a shared suffering between German and Polish women in 1945. Many of the 
German families and women who were victimized sexually by Red Army troops didn't 
see themselves as perpetrators of the war because they were now suffering equally with 
Polish families and women. 
Germans in Danzig, moreover, appeared incapable of seeing their victimization as 
war retribution and instead attributed it to the supposed racial and cultural inferiority of 
Soviet troops. Anna Schwartz, for instance, in the account above attributed Russian rapes 
to "Mongols" or "Asiatics." For her to claim that such racist language rooted German 
rape victims in Nazi rhetoric and thinking and thus stripping away Germans' innocence, 
overlooks the universality of these claims. On one level, Poles too, resorted to similarly 
racist language to explain why Soviet soldiers had raped family members. Nitschke, for 
example, described the soldier who perpetrated the burglaries and rapes in his cellar 
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during Easter week as "Mongo1."118 The descriptions and recreations of the rape of 
women in Danzig universally, perpetrated in German and Polish testimony by Russians 
with so-called "Asiatic features," reveal a latent sense of racism within the statements of 
these young Germans and Poles. Although this racism could be the result ofNazi 
propaganda and indoctrination efforts, historians can assume that for many civilian 
Danzigers, who had been exposed to and supported Nazi racist ideology and who had 
limited to null experiences interacting with Soviet citizens, simply being around a racially 
foreign entity was shocking. The additional trauma of being raped by such a person must 
only have added to the shame and psychological trauma of such a violation and 
contributed to victims later efforts to transform the perpetrators of sexual violence into a 
racially different 'other.' 
The context of racial sciences in the early part of the twentieth century, which 
placed great importance on the relationship between race and ethnicity as well as on their 
supposedly corresponding physical features, also undoubtedly defined some of the way in 
which German and Poles subsequently remembered their victimization. The 
overwhelming emphasis on racialist thought throughout Europe in this period can be seen 
in the reporting ofBritishjoumalist Alexander Werth, The Times corre~pondent, who in 
spite of his best effort to attribute Soviet soldiers indiscriminate raping of German and 
Polish women to their linguistic limitations, nonetheless also informed readers that the 
military rapists were "Mongols." He rationalized the rapes of Polish women to the Allied 
coalition by explaining that because most of the Soviet soldiers were Asian, they did not 
speak Polish or German, much less proper Russian, and subsequently could not tell the 
difference between the two languages and thus raped Germans and Poles 
118 Nitschke, 81. 
64 
indiscriminately. Werth, though, also noted that Asiatic troops were the worst when it 
came to committing violence and rape; and thus also resorted to portraying a foreign, 
uncultured "other" in his reporting of the rapes. 119 
Religious differences also played an important role in many Danzigers' efforts to 
transform Soviet soldiers into barbaric "others," efforts which only furthered their sense 
of difference and victimization. Poles and Germans, for instance, tended to juxtapose 
their fervent Christian beliefs with Soviet atheism, and frequently attributed God's 
intervention for saving them from the Bolshevik horde. Nitschke, for example, included 
the traumatic memory of rape within the context of Christian faith in his testimony, 
noting that these events occurred over the course of the Catholic Holy Week, implying 
that the Soviets as Asians and as atheists had little respect for European Christian 
traditions and practices. "On Maundy Thursday . . . the first Mongolian soldier stepped 
into our cellar, till well into the early house of the morning on Good Friday."120 Siegfried 
Lehmann, who had watched Soviet soldiers rape his pregnant mother and sister, later 
asserted that his Christian faith had saved the family from subsequently being murdered 
by them. He claimed God had intervened on behalf of his family: "We only escaped 
being shot because I sang Church Hymns as I stood waiting to be shot." 121 His sister 
Gisela's account states that the Russians spared the Lehmann family because their 
Grandmother volunteered herself to be raped. 122 To the obviously religious Lehmann 
family, Soviet destruction of Danzig's churches stood out as the most injurious and 
visually evident examples of Russian atheism and barbarity because it represented a 
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direct and visually evident attack on Christianity. The Russians, who had caught the 
Lehmanns and their fellow survivors, separated them into groups, and marched them up 
onto the Bishofs hills at the southwestern edge of Danzig where the "Stalinorgans" had 
been pummeling the city and the last German military strongpoints, to watch at gunpoint, 
"How our beautiful city was lit by fire and burnt to the ground. Danzig itself with all the 
wonderful churches, among others the large Marienkirche was destroyed."123 
Like the rape of German women, forcing Germans to watch the destruction of 
their homes, as well as their places of worship, was a means for the Russians to gain 
psychological revenge for the SS and Wehrmacht having violated the U.S.S.R and its 
people during Operation Barbarossa. In the case ofthe Lehmann family, being forced to 
witness the destruction of Danzig was a violation, similar to rape in that it left a 
significant lasting memory, a permanent scar. More importantly, these traumatic 
memories show a sense of German victimization as both former residents of a now 
pulverized city and as Christians. 
For those Germans in Danzig who did survive siege, fire, and rape, their uncertain 
future, with some facing imprisonment, others randomly executed, sometimes seemingly 
at random, and still others subject to forced labor, furthered their sense of victimization. 
Anna Schwartz was eventually taken from her air-raid shelter by Russian MPs to a farm 
where many Germans were fed, housed, and interrogated by an NKVD commissar to 
determine their wartime activities. "In a state of terror, we waited for what was to 
happen," she wrote. Anna was bounced around the former Gau to various internment 
camps. While in one at Langfuhr, several members of her original entourage were 
executed. "We assumed the Poles had accused these Germans of something," Schwartz 
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explained.124 This assumption may have been correct, as the next day she was put on a 
train headed for a work camp in the South Urals and would not return to West Germany 
until1948. Gisela Lehmann, who had been interned with her family in one of the many 
camps set up on the outskirts of the city, recalled that she and her family were lucky to 
have escaped because it subsequently became known that the prisoners from the camp, 
were almost all sent to Siberia. 125 Deportations to hard labor in various parts of the 
Soviet Union were not an uncommon experience for many Danzigers. Army Group 
Rokossovsky would deport 55,000 from East and West Prussia for forced labor in the 
Soviet Union over the next year. 126 
According to the statements, testimonies, documents and literature from Danzig, 
Germans could only perceive, empathize with, and mourn the traumas inflicted on them 
by the Red Army. Yet, in some instances, their latent sense of duty and belief in Nazi 
ideology and order caused German Danzigers to participate in SS reprisals and scorched 
earth policies. The worst manifestation of German suffering, which appears to be rape, 
seems to have been exacerbated by notions of Nazi racism against Russian soldiers with 
Asian features. German victimization by the trauma which rained down upon Danzig in 
March of 1945 also manifested itself in a desire by Danzigers to find ways to separate 
themselves from Nazi collaboration, often through a relapse into religious fervor in which 
victimhood was defined by both civic pride and religious devotion. However, this 
dynamic as described above was not untainted by Danzigers' acceptance of Nazi 
ideology. Ultimately, the complete destruction of the city of Danzig left those Germans 
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who witnessed and survived the siege with no identity other than that of traumatized 
SUrviVOrS. 
In post-war German memory, the brutality Germans experienced at the hands of 
Soviet soldiers during the Red Army's march to Berlin, particularly in the emerging Cold 
War era, propagated ideas in West Germany that the country's new citizens were not the 
perpetrators of World War II, but its victims. Not until the 1960s did a new German 
understanding ofthe Soviet motivations for their soldiers' brutality against Germans 
emerge. Introduced by Gunter Grass in Die Blechtrommel (The Tin Drum), these ideas, 
which Grass contextualized in terms of wartime experience of Danzigers certainly 
recognized Soviet troops' ferocity. Particularly in the chapters titled "Ant Traif' and 
"Should I or Shouldn't F' he simultaneously suggested that while the suffering they 
inflicted on Danzig's Germans was terrible, it was the result of German support for and 
complicity with the Nazis. 
In "Ant Traif', Grass acknowledges the suffering that Germans experienced at 
Soviet hands by recreating the culture oftrauma that existed in the final month of the war 
and by recreating the traumas that Soviet soldiers inflicted on Germans in the cellars and 
bomb shelters of Danzig during the last days of March 1945. "Ant Trail" as a title 
reflects German suffering as a result of the Russian invasion, with its connotations of 
long lines of refugees moving like ants along a cold and tumultuous trail, fleeing the Red 
Army in their migrations west during the winter and spring of 1945. Although Grass was 
not a direct witness to Danzig's trauma in March 1945, since he was wounded at Cottbus 
while serving in the Weln:nacht, he nonetheless also portrays the trauma many city 
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residents experienced through imagery of refugees, soldiers, and tanks fleeing the 
fighting and of soldiers and Volkssturm men hung by the SS for cowardice and by 
depicting the fear and trauma of Danzig's cellar culture. Grass furthers his depiction of 
German victimization at Soviet soldiers' hands by portraying the experiences of a 
fictional group of Germans, the Matzerath family, in one ofDanzig's basements. After 
the Russians enter the Matzerath basement, three of them immediately began to rape 
Lena Greff, a native Danziger and friend of the Matzerath family. The protagonist, Oskar 
Matzerath, watches as, "more and more calmly Ia Greff lay spread out beneath one after 
another of the three Ivans. When one of them decided to call it a day, my gifted drummer 
handed Oskar on to a sweating young fellow ... " 127 Lena's rape by the soldiers was 
certainly a common memory for German women in the east during the final months of 
the war, and thus Grass' inclusion of the rape emphasizes Soviet brutality in the most 
gruesome and realistic ways. 
However, Grass departs from stereotypical notions of Soviet brutality during the 
war and rejects popular portrayals of Soviet perpetrators as atheistic uncultured 
barbarians from the "Mongol" east, preferring instead to indicate that the soldiers from 
different Russian nationalities participated in the rape of German women, regardless of 
their racial physical features. Oskar describes the Russians who enter the Matzerath 
basement as "perfectly normal Russians, slight racial mixture ... six or seven of them 
appeared on the stairs with big eyes and Tommy guns."128 Oskar's textbook familiarity 
with the ethnic breakdown of the Red Army may be an allusion by Grass to illustrate the 
result of Nazi propaganda efforts in Danzig prior to the invasion. More importantly, 
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128 Ibid, 392. 
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Grass points out that the Red Anny soldiers who participated in rape were not only 
Asian. 
Grass also illustrates the randomness of the rape of German women in that not all 
of the Matzerath basement's female captives were victimized. The Russians do not rape 
Maria Matzerath, who is much younger, and presumably would have been a preferable 
victim over the old and sickly Lena, because she is cradling her son Kurt. Oskar states, "I 
had read in Rasputin that the Russian are great lovers of children. This, as I was soon to 
learn was perfectly true. Maria trembled needlessly. She failed to understand why the 
four I vans who were not busy with la Greff left Kurt sitting on her lap instead of taking 
turns at it themselves . .. " 129 When we consider this tum of events in Grass's story, with a 
similar description of witnessed trauma from the Lehmann family, it may very well be 
that Russians showed some sympathy to mothers. Lena's rape, as well as that of 
Siegfried and Gisela's grandmother, demonstrates that age, physical appearance and 
condition seemed to be relatively unimportant to the rank-and-file Red Anny soldier in 
choosing victims of sexual violence. 
This depiction of the Matzerath family's suffering at the hands of Soviet 
victimizers enables Grass to suggest that much of the responsibility for Soviet barbarity 
fell on Germans who were unable and unwilling to part with their Nazi past. 
Symbolically Grass makes this connection through his depiction of the family's patriarch, 
Alfred Matzerath. A Reichsdeutsche originally from the Rhineland, Alfred is an agent of 
Nazism who refuses to believe that the Nazi era has come to an end. As the city burned, 
he watched from the cellar in disbelief," .. . as a child who can't make up his mind 
whether to go on believing in Santa Claus ... " Denial quickly dissolves into fear, when 
129 Ibid, 392. 
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Alfred realizes he still is in possession of a Nazi party pin, which, if discovered by the 
Russians, would mean certain execution, because as Oskar points out, "You didn't joke 
with the Russians." 130 Determined to erase any form of visual or material proof of his 
wartime politics, Alfred tries to pass the pin to the basement's female inhabitants, but 
Lena and Maria, both of whom are native Danzigers, distance themselves from the past 
once possessed by Alfred by refusing to take Alfred's pin. Oskar narrates that Alfred 
then decides to smash the pin into the ground, since neither Lena Greff nor Maria 
Matzerath would take the pin from him. 131 Lena and Maria, both ofwhom are native 
Danzigers, distance themselves from the past once possessed by Alfred by refusing to 
take Alfred's pin. Oskar, though, refuses to allow Alfred to obfuscate the past by 
destroying the pin. He rescues the pin from oblivion, and when a Soviet soldier finishes 
with Lena, tidies himself, and picks up the diminutive Oskar, thinking him to be a young 
child, Oskar hands Alfred back his pin. Alfred grabs the pin from Oskar, and desperately 
tries to hide his Nazi association by swallowing the pin, an act which only makes those 
past associations obvious to the Soviet soldiers: 
Little by little, fear took possession ofMatzerath as he felt the emblem of his 
party between his fingers ... But he wanted desperately to get rid of it, and despite 
the rich imagination he had shown as a cook and window dresser, he could think 
of no other hiding place than his mouth ... That little move was enough to startle 
the two lvans ... They thrust there Tommy guns at Matzerath's belly and it was 
plain for all to see that Matzerath was trying to swallow something. 132 
Oskar, by reclaiming the party pin and giving it back to Alfred, refused to allow his 
presumptive father to escape responsibility for his Nazi past. One of the Russian soldiers, 
frustrated with the situation, shoots Alfred using an entire magazine of bullets. 
130 Ibid, 
131 Ibid, 391. 
132 Ibid, 393-394. 
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Ultimately, Grass attributes the ferocity and excess of the soldier to Alfred's refusal to 
admit his responsibility for the war. Oskar, by reclaiming the party pin and giving it back 
to Alfred, causes the death ofhis presumptive father. Symbolically, it is a statement of 
blame and punishment of crimes, which focuses on the memories of German 
victimization. 
Grass continues to place responsibility for the war squarely on the Germans' 
shoulders in next chapter, "Should I or Shouldn't I," a chapter in whichthe Poles begin to 
take over the city. Maria, now an embittered and traumatized war widow, is employed by 
Fajngold, a survivor ofTreblinka concentration camp. Maria, consumed by German 
suffering during the war, shows Fajngold the most visible manifestation of that suffering, 
the corpse of Alfred, still in the cellar. By showing Alfred's body to Fajngold, a survivor 
of tragedy himself, Maria is equating the crimes committed against Germans during the 
war with the Holocaust. In this case, Grass presents Maria's actions as an allegory for the 
large numbers of people in post-war West Germany who felt that the two tragedies were 
comparable to one another. Maria keeps the body around long after Alfred's death, 
displaying it so that she too may possess victimhood, embodied in Alfred's corpse. But 
Grass also points out the absurdity of such conclusions in depicting Maria, while happy 
to work briefly for Fajngold, as only having sympathy for German suffering as opposed 
to Jewish suffering, evident in her failure to understand Fajngold's insanity and in her 
blunt rejection of his offer of marriage. She instead opts to be transferred with Oskar and 
Kurt to West Germany, where her notions of German victimization would be accepted 
and embraced. 
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How well Germans have absorbed Grass' claims about German culpability for the 
end of the war in German cities in the east and for the subsequent victimization by Soviet 
soldiers is less certain. For instance, Oliver Hirschbiegel's 2004 film Der Untergang 
(Downfall), loosely based on the diary ofHitler's personal secretary, Traudt Junge 
suggested once more that Germans had been victimized by Soviet totalitarianism in the 
war's aftermath. The film, which highlights the last days of a number of high ranking 
Nazis, left to defend Berlin from the advancing Russian Army, depicts the widespread 
panic associated with the collapse of the Nazi state, with panic over the Soviet advance 
and loyalty to the old regime often leading to suicides of Nazi officials in Berlin. The 
film also depicts SS reprisals against pedestrian Berliners as well as a general trend of un-
necessary German deaths in the defense ofthe city. Although, Hirschbiegel's film 
focuses on the German defense ofBerlin, its last frames recount the fates of Berlin's Nazi 
defenders, with disproportionate emphasis on the leaders who came into Soviet captivity, 
such as General Wilhelm Mohnke and General Helmuth Weidling, both charged with 
Berlin's defense, or Otto Giinsche, Hitler's personal adjunct, all ofwhom spent many 
years in Soviet captivity. 
While the strengths of this film are its historical accuracy and a realistic depiction 
of a pre-traumatic terror syndrome caused by shelling, suicide and SS reprisals in Berlin 
in the late April of 1945, Der Untergang adroitly avoids the topic of the Holocaust. 
Furthermore, German perpetration of wrongdoing on anyone other than Germans in the 
film is non-existent with no mention whatsoever to any specific or general Nazi crimes in 
Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union, against either Jews, Slavs, or any other victims of 
the war. The very word "Jewish" is only spoken twice in the dialogue and only at the end 
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of the film, does Hirschbiegel include a text frame which reads by the time of the official 
surrender on 7 May, 1945, " ... the war had cost over 50 million lives. 6 million Jews had 
been murdered in concentration camps."133 
While this film has nothing to do with the fall of Danzig, which occurred a month 
before the fall of Berlin and Hitler's suicide, it raises the issue of the memory associated 
with the Russian siege of German cities in the east. According to the statements, 
testimonies and documents from Danzig, Germans could only perceive, empathize with, 
and mourn the traumas inflicted on them by the Red Army. Yet, in some instances, their 
latent sense of duty and belief in Nazi ideology and order caused German Danzigers to 
participate in SS reprisals and scorched earth policies. In many ways, this film is an 
extension of this failure to establish a balanced discussion of German victimization and 
perpetration. Surely, at least some of those Nazi officials in and around the Berlin 
Fuhrerbunker, or lay residents who lived in the vicinity of the Reich Chancellery had 
some levels of knowledge ofNazi crimes. However, the final scene of the movie shows 
an aged Traudl Junge, the former personal secretary of Hitler, express her innocence in 
not knowing about anything to do with the Holocaust until after the war. Is Hirschbiegel 
trying to convey the idea that a pre-traumatic terror syndrome was the cause of so many 
Germans being unable to see beyond their own victimization at the hands of the Soviets? 
Junge's post-war realization and ultimate acceptance of her participation in the Nazi 
regime, as the very last frame of the film is analogous to the film's overall approach to 
the topic of the Holocaust as almost an afterthought. Hirschbiegel's interest in many high 
ranking Nazis' Soviet imprisonment conveys the idea that for people in a city like Berlin 
or Danzig, a self-realization of German perpetration of the war could only occur in a 
133 Oliver Hirschbiegel, Der Unte~gang, (~.<m?J<lntiJJJ,.ili}LeE2.dl!ktiQD_GrJJQI.:L 2004. 
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post-war Europe, where the emerging communist authorities and governments would be 
most active and vociferous in carrying out de-nazification. 
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The Reclaiming of Gdansk 
By 30 March 1945 Danzig was nothing more than a memory, both physically and 
politically. That day General Berling's 151 Polish Army, which had helped the Soviets 
win the city, hoisted the red.,.and-white flag of Poland on the remains of city hall and 
announced the creation of the Polish provisional government for Gdansk. The 
provisional government faced enormous challenges including how to rebuild a destroyed 
city and how to negotiate with Russian military officials to speed up wartime recovery. 
These challenges in tum were complicated by the city's diplomatic insecurity. As the 
rise of the Cold War left the city's new Polish occupiers without multilateral international 
security guarantees, Polish communist officials also struggled with how to recast the 
city's German past, for the needs of the Polish present. What would that mean in terms 
of immediate post-war trauma? How would Polish efforts to integrate Gdansk into 
Poland impact perceptions of the city's past? How would these efforts subsequently be 
remembered by those Gem1ans and Poles who experienced them? 
What emerged from the rubble ofDanzig in the year 1945 was the new city of 
Gdansk. A place where Polish authority executed their claims to the region through a 
multi-faceted process ofpolonization. In the process, the often traumatic initiatives to 
effect this change mirrored those of the nazification programs of Danzig during the war 
and pre-war years. On the one hand, German memory of this period focused on 
sufferings inflicted against the German population which had survived the capitulation to 
the Red Army. On the other hand, Polish memory of the immediate post-war period 
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justified the suffering inflicted upon Germans and their collaborators in terms of fulfilling 
the greater goals of reshaping Danzig into Gdansk. 
The Poles faced the overwhelming task of rebuilding the city, as Danzig had been 
almost completely destroyed. Elizabeth Clarke used the term "systematic" to describe 
the extent to which the city was reduced to rubble by the Red Army. Some of the few 
buildings which the Russians had spared included the East Prussian Fire and Life 
Assurance, the Danzig Police Headquarters, and the Danzig Prison so that the NKVD 
could examine records of ownership, criminal, and political archives, as well as police 
files from during the war. Ninety percent of all buildings, eighty-five percent of 
industrial plants, and thirty-five percent of roads were destroyed. Clarke quotes a recent 
Gdansk tour guide book which stated that overall, ninety percent of the old city had been 
destroyed and that two to three million cubic meters of rubble lay where Danzig had once 
stood. 134 These statistics, although rather impersonal and seemingly impossible to 
quantify, do indicate the enormity of the job the Poles had in rebuilding Gdansk. 
Gdansk's now Polish city administration also inherited a city with a population 
ravaged by evacuation and war. The problem for the Polish government was that Gdansk 
had suffered a severe population loss as a result of the Soviet invasion. Nearly a quarter 
of the city's population, including many Poles had fled the Red Army's advance and 
attack on Danzig. Another quarter of the city residents had been killed in the fighting. 
Entire neighborhoods lay empty and the reduced population was highly problematic for 
both rebuilding and reclaiming Gdansk. 135 
134 Clarke, 5-6. 
135 Schieder, 82-84. 
77 
In addition to these challenges related to post-war reconstruction, Polish 
authorities faced another set of unique challenges in their accession of the city. The Poles 
shared authority with the Red Army and as a result their desire to rebuild and repopulate 
the city often appeared at odds with the Soviet authorities' demands to exploit what little 
remained in the city for Soviet ends. Soviet and Polish officials for example, clashed 
over the pace of Poles returning to their homes that had escaped war damage, with Soviet 
officials, according to the commander of the Polish civil militia in a report dated 30 April 
1945, refusing to allow Poles to reclaim their former homes: "The Polish population, 
which came back to these residences, from which they had been evacuated by the 
Germans and even those, who wanted to return to their houses and dwellings, were not 
allowed to enter by the Soviet Authority."136 
The tensions were exacerbated by the fact that all measures of the occupation 
were ultimately determined by the Soviets until later that spring; and they tended to place 
Moscow's demands for material reparations above the Polish reconstruction effort. 137 To 
the Spoils of War Commission in Moscow, theft of goods was supposed to contribute to 
the rebuilding of the Soviet Union, which took precedence over the rebuilding of Poland. 
The Soviet military rank-and-file further desecrated the city even beyond the trauma of 
rape, as they were most known for their predisposition towards theft and robbery. 
Numerous accounts describe their specific interest in goods such watches, bikes, and 
machinery. For the rank-and-file, anything that wasn't locked down or guarded was fair 
game. 138 
136 Nitschke, 13. 
137 Schieder, 75-83. 
138 Tighe, 207-208. 
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The Poles owed much gratitude to the Soviets for liberating them from Hitler and 
simply had to tolerate such behavior through the spring and early summer. The Polish 
communists also undoubtedly recognized that their legitimacy was painfully thin 
throughout Poland and particularly thin in Gdansk. Polish communists had not enjoyed 
popular support in either the interwar period or during World War II under German 
occupation. Krystyna Kersten contends that as Russian occupation authority gave way to 
the Polish communist authority, Stalin's prerogatives were to allow the Poles to form a 
communist state with goals designed specifically to rebuild and reshape the future of 
Poland without simply mirroring Soviet communism. 139 On the other hand, Norman 
Davies contends that Soviet political decision making was very active in forming the 
future of the Polish communist state. The assumption of Polish territories in the east, 
including cities such as Vilnius and Lw6w as part of the shifting of Poland's borders 
westward, forced massive migrations to destroyed and largely abandoned cities such as 
Gdansk. Davies contends that these population shifts provided the primary impetus for 
reconstructing a city like Gdansk that had been a predominantly German cultural space 
for centuries. 140 
On another level, Poland's new communist authorities also encountered 
extraterritorial challenges to their administration of Gdansk. Emerging tensions between 
the Soviet Union and its Anglo-American allies appeared to place in jeopardy the 
extension of Polish authority into the recovered territories, of which Gdansk was a part. 
These formally German territories, stretched from the pre-1939 Polish-German border 
139 Krystyna Kersten, The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948, (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1991 ), 173. 
140 Davies Norman and Roger Moorhouse, Microcosm: Portrait of a Central European City, (London: 
Random House, 2002), 411-412. 
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westward to the Oder-Neisse River and south to the San River. They were incorporated 
into the new Polish state seemingly at the behest of allied concessions. Their 
incorporation into the post-war Polish state had been discussed at the Tehran conference 
in November and December of 1943 as a means of compensating Poles and for territory 
the Soviet Union had seized in the east in the first weeks of the war but subsequently had 
refused to relinquish. 141 The Soviet authority's heavy political hand, particularly their 
refusal to accept the Polish London government-in-exile as the legitimate government for 
Poland and to militarily assist the insurrection launched in August 1944 by the exiled 
government's insurgents in Warsaw and the subsequent communist political putsch in 
Romania that same month, had left Britain's Winston Churchill, hesitant to officially 
endorse the western territories' inclusion into the Polish state. 142 At Yalta, in January and 
February 1945, the Western Allies had suspended an official decision on this matter until 
a final peace conference. Thus, although the future Polish communist government had 
signed an agreement with the Soviet Union which outlined the territorial boundaries of 
the Polish state and included these so-called western territories in November 1943. The 
refusal of the western Allies to do the same and the absence of a post-war peace 
conference to provide mutual security guarantees for Poland's new western boundary 
meant that Polish sovereignty there was far from secure. Thus, for the Polish communist 
authorities the threat of western retaliation or of some form of German revanchism 
remained. 143 
141 Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They waged and the Peace They Sought, (Princeton, 
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The Poles responded to their rebuilding challenges and in particular their insecure 
hold over the western territories by embracing a stringent polonization campaign, 
reminiscent of the germanization previously promoted there during World War II. One 
of the first directives by the Warsaw government was to order Polish railroad workers 
from the former city of Bromberg, now called Bydgoszcz, to the city to repair and clear 
tracks between Gdansk and Gdynia on 3 April, 1945. They simultaneously changed and 
repaired signs, which were now written in Polish. 144 As already mentioned, the Polish 
communists had encouraged millions of Poles displaced by war and Soviet assumption of 
eastern territories to move west. Recent research by Sylwia Bykowska claims however, 
that by and large the Polish government did not encourage people to immigrate to a place 
like Gdansk, preferring the displaced persons to settle in less appealing areas ofthe 
western territories. The Polish communists intentionally downplayed Gdansk as a 
destination for refugees as they predicted it would be a popular destination without 
having to excessively encourage Poles from the east to resettle in the city. 145 
However, Bykowska claims that the immigrants who did come to Gdansk came for 
economic opportunities, which the rebuilding of a port city would surely provide. She 
claims that many of these displaced Poles coming to Gdansk, arrived with these false 
notions of its history, politics, and ethnic demographics. Their ignorance left these 
people with the impression that the city had a long and proud Polish history and identity. 
The refugees saw the city as home of the defenders of the Westerplatte Garrison and the 
Polish Post Office and were thus quite shocked to find the presence of Germans and a 
German past among the rubble. Their surprise manifested itself in animosity towards the 
144 Tighe, 205. 
145 Sylwia Bykowska, "Gdansk-miasto (szybko) odzyskane," Biuletyn Instytutu Pamieci Narodowej , NR 9-
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Germans who had survived the battle and remained in the city. 146 These displaced Poles 
were eager to embrace a policy of strict polonization which the communists would 
subsequently enforce. The question for the Polish communists then, was how to create a 
propaganda campaign that would support claiming as Polish a traditionally German space 
such as Gdansk. 
The Polish communists moreover, were not above realigning history to meet 
larger national needs. Through propaganda efforts, they claimed that the newly acquired 
areas of modem-day western Poland had been historically Polish in the Middle Ages and 
thus, their incorporation into the post-war Polish state was an act of recovering what 
originally had been Polish. Even in places like Western Pomerania and Silesia, territories 
which had been a part of the Polish state ofMieszko I (960-992), this argument defied 
political realities, because Polish sovereignty had been relatively brief and had collapsed 
by 1181 in western Pomerania and 1368 in Silesia. But, communist efforts to include 
Gdansk as a part ofthe "recovered territories" manipulated the territorial reach of the 
medieval Polish state because Gdansk had not become Polish until1454, long after the 
medieval Polish state that the communists claimed to have "recovered" had collapsed. 147 
Communist attempts to include Gdansk into the historic medieval Polish state also 
worked to suppress the city's German-dominated history. In places in East and West 
Prussia, which had a stronger Polish presence this was easier and more justifiable. 148 
But, Danzig did not have a huge Polish presence in the modem period and had not 
146 Ibid, 40-45. 
147 Tighe, 23. 
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possessed significant Polish population since the medieval Polish state.149 Most 
historians agree that Poles had not made up any more than about five percent of the 
region's population prior to the war. Finally, including Gdansk in the recovered 
territories denied the city's historical opposition and its economic competition with the 
Polish Republic in the interwar period. 150 Part of this historical re-interpretation of 
history presented to the Polish public in propaganda campaigns as a consequence of the 
post-war need to embrace national unity. These manufactured notions of history to 
support a communist future was largely accepted by Poles from east and central Poland 
who had been displaced by the ravages of war and were forced to migrate. Thus 
widespread acceptance of a policy of reclaiming territories which would entail that 
Poland's traditional borders shift westward to support these migrations. 
Even as the Poles embraced historical ideas that did not always apply to Gdansk, 
the questionable international security of the western territories undoubtedly made them 
hesitant to completely erase the city's heritage through its most visually evident form: 
architecture. Part of the challenge in the rebuilding process of Gdansk for Polish 
architects and engineers was to rewrite the memory of the city. For communist 
authorities in 1945, tying Gdansk back into the Polish sphere through rebuilding efforts 
would justify annexation of the city without official international approval or historical 
validity. Their task was to build Gdansk as a place that always had a strong Polish 
element, while being palatable and politically correct for a communist future, and at the 
same time making decisions that did not openly provoke western ire. A Polish tourism 
booklet of the city, produced in 1962 shows photographs of specific destroyed places in 
149 Ibid, 17. 
15° Kersten, 272 . 
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Gdansk in April of 1945, juxtaposed with photos of the same places in 1962, completely 
rebuilt. No doubt written under the auspices of communist authors and censors the 
pamphlet includes a brief history of the city intended to try to justify rebuilding and 
reclaiming efforts by linking the city to a historically Polish past. The author offers as 
evidence, statements such as, "The very earliest relics-archaeological finds dating from 
the Tenth through Twelfth centuries, a testimony to the city's Slavonic past. .. " or" ... just 
as in centuries gone by, Gdansk owes its development today to the fact that it serves the 
Polish maritime economy ... " 151 By including photos of rubble from 1945, with photos of 
an aesthetically pleasing and bustling communist society in 1962, the authors of the 
booklet wish to show more than how successful the rebuilding projects had been. The 
entire booklet is meant to demonstrate in a Machiavellian sense, under the guise of 
tourism, that the ends- successful modern Gdansk- stands testament to the validity of the 
means- the Polish reclaiming initiative. 
Evidence of Polish discomfort over the presence of Germans in Gdansk can be 
seen in the ways they deprived them of food and then held them responsible for diseases 
plaguing the city and attributed to the Germans. Many reports indicated that in former 
areas of East and West Prussia, disease often caused by malnutrition was prevalent 
among the region's Germans as a national group. Because of their status as a defeated 
people, they had almost no access to food. One report stated that Germans in Gdansk 
were preparing food with weeds and using fertilizer for salt. Gisela Lehmann 
corroborated these claims when she stated that "nothing was left for the remaining 
German people in any way." She and her family had to beg for scraps, as anything of 
15 1 Jerzy Stankiewicz and Bohdan Szermer, Gdansk, (Warsaw: Arkady Edition, 1962), 4-5. 
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substance they had was usually stolen. 152 Under these conditions typhoid fever was 
common, especially in the jails and interment camps which mostly housed Germans. 
Polish authorities however, blamed the Germans for being harbingers and propagators of 
disease and even went so far as to suggest that their removal from Gdansk would end a 
typhoid epidemic there. The director of the Gdansk Health Board suggested for example: 
"With the resettlement, even if not of the whole, but at least the largest part ofthe 
German population from Gdansk, the epidemic could be completely subdued." 153 
Another major challenge facing the Polish authorities was the place of Germans in 
a city whose future was to be Polish. The Poles immediately began to utilize the 
remaining Germans as a labor resource. Most of the Germans who had not fled from the 
Red Army and had survived the fall and destruction of the city, as well as the subsequent 
expulsions that spring and summer were designated for labor efforts in rebuilding the city 
and its infrastructure. Those who remained were categorized as "able-bodied" or "non-
able bodied." A later directive produced by the Polish Social Security Commission at 
the Conference on Questions of the Evacuation and Co-Ordination of the New 
Settlement, on 22 September 1945 stated that any non-able bodied Germans, including 
those who rejected working for the state, were to be expelled. 154 German labor was doing 
much of the actual bricklaying for the purposes of rebuilding Gdansk and reclaiming the 
city into a Polish sphere of which it had belonged to earlier in the millennium, with labor 
representative of its more recent German character as Danzig. 
Polish authorities, citing German responsibility for disease, ultimately expelled 
Germans from the city and from the country. Expulsions began in earnest from Gdansk 
152 Lehmann, 3-4. 
153 Nitschke, 104, 107. 
154 Ibid, 99. 
85 
to points westward well before the Potsdam conference in July and August of 1945 
officially sanctioned expulsions. As early as 1 June, signs ordering Germans to leave 
were posted throughout the city. 155 The Polish authorities were inconsistent in the 
notification of Germans designated for expulsion. In some instances prior to Potsdam, 
departure cards were mailed to Germans, ordering them to a specific train station for 
departure to the west. However, the Polish militia, particularly prior to the summer of 
1945, were famous for forcibly and arbitrarily extracting Germans from entire rows of 
houses, giving them minutes to choose some belongings, before herding them to the 
trains. In many cases, expulsion was fairly voluntary and Germans co-operated fully 
with the militias, knowing that they had no future as Germans in Gdansk. 156 It is unclear 
how many Germans fled, emigrated, or were transferred out of Danzig prior to Potsdam, 
as sufficient records of this were not kept. 157 The scope of the expulsions made it appear 
as if they were wholesale rather than selective in nature. Expulsion at the hands of the 
Polish authorities also did not seem limited to non-able bodied and sick Germans, but 
rather were random and targeted Germans indiscriminately. 
After the 2 August, 1945 Potsdam Agreement stipulated legal and humane 
expulsion as a means of resolving ethnic strife in the region, almost the entire remaining 
German population of 100,000 in Gdansk, not imprisoned was marked for expulsion. 
However, most witnesses indicate that there was certainly nothing humane about 
expulsions after Potsdam. Polish authorities in Gdansk transported Germans in much the 
same way Germans had transported Jews and Poles to concentration camps or other 
points in the east. Gerhard Nitschke witnessed Polish militias systematically evacuating 
155 Schieder, 108. 
156 Ibid. 
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Germans street by street in Soppot in September. He reported that Germans were ordered 
to pack and were then taken to the train station in the evening, so that their expulsion 
would be done in secret. "There it became clear this was a raid concerned with the 
cleansing of the city," Nitschke remarked. He also noted that over 8,000 people were 
expelled from Soppot in August alone, including sixty sick and injured individuals from 
the German hospital there. 158 The Lehmann family also was expelled in August. Gisela 
recorded that they were taken to the train station with similar abruptness, and placed on a: 
" .. . Transport of injured people back to the now occupied Reich. A filthy cattle car which 
contained a large number of amputees and very sick people was now to be our home for 
two weeks. During this time several people died."159 
International media coverage of the trauma inflicted by these so called "humane" 
expulsions suggests a further similarity between post-war polonization efforts and 
wartime nazification efforts. German trauma during the expulsions revealed a dynamic 
of retribution against Germans and other expelled enemies of the state similar to German 
repression ofPoles and Jews during World War II. Norman Clark, who reported on 24 
August from Berlin for the British newspaper News Chronicle, testified that the 
polonization of Gdansk was just as brutal as the nazification of Danzig had been during 
the war. The Berlin correspondent of the Times suggested in early September that Polish 
authorities had executed male heads of households before initiating deportation 
procedures, a move similar, of course to Nazi efforts to eliminate those who posed the 
greatest threat to Nazification: "A women recovering from typhoid had, she stated, seen 
her husband beaten to death by Poles and she had then. been driven from her farm near 
158 Ibid, 183-184. 
159 Lehmann, 4. 
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Danzig to work in fields." 16° Clarke also noted that Polish authorities slowed transports, 
with some taking over a week to cross the Oder, with little food, water, or provisions and 
enduring constant harassment by Poles and the Red Army. This post-Potsdam trauma 
suffered by the expellees from Gdansk spared neither adults nor children, healthy or 
otherwise. The Times for example reported an expose about the arrival in Berlin of three 
orphans from Gdansk, who were parentless and deported alone. The article read, 
"These three German children are paying for the sins their fathers may have 
committed. They are 'displaced' orphans, turned out ofPolish orphanage in 
Danzig and sent back to Germany in tightly packed cattle trucks, without medical 
care and almost without food. The Poles, many of whose children looked like 
these not long ago, are clearing all hospitals of German patients, no matter how 
sick.l61 
This dynamic of retribution to the very last against the Germans was manifested 
in other forms of trauma and repression against the expelled. Clarke noted that trains 
coming in from Danzig, full of expellees, also carried Polish bandits who stripped the 
expellees of valuables: "Poles, who sat apart, waiting for the next train to go out. Then 
they would board it, and going through the train, would force these unprotected mothers 
and women to give up any possessions of value, including watches and jewels. 162 
Continued violence, repression, and robbery remained a problem for those who, after 
already enduring so much, were forcibly transferred to the west. 
As expulsion dropped in volume by late autumn 1945, the Warsaw government's 
new prerogative for cities like Gdansk was to identify and investigate Poles suspected of 
collaborating with the Nazis as well as to decide if the remaining Germans had any future 
160 Ibid, 112. 
161 Alfred de Zayas, The German Expellees: Victims in War and Peace, (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 
109. 
162 Ibid, Ill. 
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or usefulness in the city. As the year 1945 came to an end, the Poles placed the 
rebuilding efforts and the need to retain skilled individuals, regardless of ethnicity, ahead 
oftrying to de-germanize and de-nazify Poland. By 1946 however, few Germans 
remained in Gdansk, with estimates suggesting that by this year only 6,000 Germans 
remained in the city, while 284,000 had been expelled since March of 1945.163 Regional 
Verification Committees, also established in 1945, were to complete this final stage of 
polonization. The drop in the German population of the region suggests that their efforts 
were largely targeted at those Poles who had claimed ethnic German status during the 
war and at mixed ethnicities, such as Kashubians, Koznavians, and Masurians, who also 
had been privileged racially over Poles by the Germans. 
The Committees soon found great difficulty in proving guilt based on the 
wartime Volksliste, since so many Poles had applied out of fear of imprisonment or 
expulsion and therefore, the lists could hardly be considered accurate. 164 Subsequently, 
these committees used a number of tests to determine the "polishness" of those being 
investigated.165 Most of these tests by the Verification Committees were subjective and 
highly inconclusive. The Verification Committees, for example, investigated individuals 
by their last names and ethnic self identification. The accuracy of this method was 
questionable for the Polish authorities because of Gdansk's inherently mixed ethnic 
character. 166 At the same time, altering one's name and ethnically identifying oneselfin 
such a way that would fit into the racially homogenous goals of the new Polish state 
163 Federal Ministry for Expellee, Refugees, and War Victims Pub., Care and Help for Expellees, Refugees, 
Victims of Material War Damage, Evacuees, Prisoners of War and Civilian Prisoners, Repatriated Persons, 
Non-German Refugees, (Bonn, Germany, 1964), 9. 
164 Nitschke, 139 
165 Ibid. 
166 Tighe, 221. 
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helped prevent expulsion for those Germans who wished to stay. Hans von Lehndorffs 
states in his memoirs that while he was working in a hospital forty miles south-east of 
Gdansk after the fighting had stopped, many Germans in this region had begun to refer to 
themselves as "Masuren" in order to deny their true German extraction. This statement 
suggests, the Verification Committees throughout the former areas of East and West 
Prussia investigated Poles, Kashubians, Musurians and other smaller Slavic groups with 
the same vigor as Germans to determine possible wartime collaboration with the Nazis. 
167 Problems in the standards determining the retention or expulsion of specific segments 
of the populations allowed for a certain amount of randomness and subjectivity in 
deciding who was fit to stay in Gdansk and who was not. 168 
The bottom line for the Polish authorities in deciding who could be ethnically 
polonized was labor requirements, which stipulated that a certain amount of labor 
including Germans, was needed in the rebuilding process. At the Congress of 
Autochthones in November 1946 the chairman of the Ministry for the Recovered 
Territories, Wladylsaw Gomulka, stated; "We shall not give up one single Pole to the 
Germans, and we do not want among us Poles one single German."169 Gomulka and the 
Polish communists didn't want Germans, but had a broad definition now of who 
constituted a Pole. In other words, Kashubians, too, could be Poles, but Germans 
generally couldn't. This statement shows that by the end of 1945, a policy of population 
retention superseded expulsion, especially when one considers that by this time a million 
people had been determined to be Polish under Gomulka's tenure. The needs oflabor 
and reconstruction had to taken precedent over establishing an ethnically pure and 
167 Lehndorff, 289. 
168 Nitshcke, 139. 
169 Tighe, 221 . 
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collaborator free province of Gdansk. Verification Committees served to both polonize 
the city as well as contributing to the higher prerogative of the Polish government to 
reclaim the city of Gdansk under sometimes dubious pretenses. 
The traumatic experience ofthe shifting populations, borders, and possession of 
the city of Gdansk left an imprint on how subsequent generations of both Germans and 
Poles remember the polonization of the city. The trauma of Danzig's Germans and this 
post-war memory is best captured in the canonical fiction of Gunter Grass. His work, as 
already discussed in previous chapters, shows both sorrow and acceptance of the post war 
settlement. Grassian memory of subsequent generations has accepted that polinization of 
the city was terrible, but necessary for the future stability of the region. Polish literature, 
after the fall of communism in Poland in 1989, became more liberalized and subsequently 
it became permissible to publish more complex accounts of memory of these complicated 
events following the capitulation of the city in 1945. A memory of traumatic events, 
shared by both Germans and Poles, revolving around one main issue: the validity of 
Polish claims to modem Gdansk. 
Stephan Chwin in his book, Hanemann, translated into English in 1995 as Death 
in Danzig, focused his story on the repopulation and reclaiming of the new of city of 
Gdansk. This fictitious account provides a virtual biography of the trials and tribulations 
faced by Germans who were allowed or forced to remain in the city as well as examining 
the motivations, apprehensions, and guilt of those Poles who relocated to Gdansk from 
other parts of war tom Poland. What seems most interesting about Death in Danzig in 
the context of examining the complex situation of population shifts and the claiming of 
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space is Chwin's belief that it was ultimately correct for the Poles to take the rubble of 
Danzig and create the new city of Gdansk. While Chwin is apologetic for the trauma 
afflicted on Germans in the city, he defends his opinion that the reclaiming of Gdansk 
was ultimately justifiable. 
The protagonist ofChwin's novel is a un-named young Polish boy who relocates 
with his parents from Warsaw to Gdansk after the fighting. As he and his parents search 
for a suitable house to claim and move into, they realize the "omnipresence of a German 
past," manifested mainly in the changing of the names of places, signs still written in 
German, and objects left behind by those who had fled. 17° Chwin's characters also 
embody a sense of guilt for inheriting spaces of atrocities. This guilt for the events which 
transpired at the end of the war in the city is embodied by the haunting remnants of 
Gdansk's former residents. This Polish family happens to move downstairs into an 
apartment where Hanemann still resides upstairs, in the former district of Langfuhr, now 
renamed Wrzeszcz. As the protagonist narrates, " ... as soon as Mama stepped into the 
hallway ... she jumped back right away without really knowing why ... Over the letterbox 
marked 'Briefe' was a copper plate, with names written in shiny slanting letters: 'Erich 
Schultz,' 'Wolfgang Bierenstein,' 'Johann Peltz."171 The mother's fright may have been 
an allegory for guilt over the destruction of German Danzig and the evacuation of many 
of its residents. 
At the same time, the material culture left by the Germans of Danzig is 
metaphorical for the traumas and injustices suffered by Poles in centuries past. Among 
the foremost remnants of German culture, discovered by Poles claiming new homes are 
170Joanna K Stimmel, "Reading the Urban Time/Space: Danzig/Gdansk as a Transnational Memoryscape 
in Grass' Unkenrufe and Chwin's Hanemann." (2005 GSA Meeting), 3. 
171 Stefan Chwin, Death in Danzig, trans. by Philip Boehm, (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Inc., 1995), 72. 
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the objects left behind. The objects of German Danzigers are a constant reminder of the 
traumatic past ofthe city. Yet, these objects' age and filth also serve to emphasize the 
ways in which the Germans who had owned them had subordinated Polish national 
desires. As the mother investigates her new home, the narrator writes, 
"She opened the doors to the mahogany chest, rattling the leaded glass 
planes. Among the cobalt glasses and ceramic jars labeled 'Pfeffer,' 
'Salz,' and 'Zucker,' she saw a gleaming white oval tureen with a hand-
painted Chinese seascape-blue brushwork and brown-sailed junk-and a 
lid shaped like a pagoda. When she lifted the lid she left a fingerprint 
next to the Rosenthal emblem-a dark pattern on a film of dust, like a 
round postmark on an ivory colored envelope."172 
These objects denote the sense of smug comfort embodied by nineteenth century German 
petty bourgeois material culture. As the mother investigates these objects representative 
of German cultural, social, and politically superiority, she notices their dustiness and 
uncleanliness. Chwin tries to capture the German repression of the Poles, during the time 
in which many of these artifacts were made, through the symbolism of a gilded, yet filthy 
material culture. These nice middle class objects are seemingly gilded by the filth of 
German crimes against Poles throughout history. 173 
No matter how much Death in Danzig focuses on the memories of Germans' past 
associations with the city, it also demonstrates Chwin's opinion that Polish reclamation 
of the city was justifiable. German culture in Danzig, Chwin reminds his readers had 
degraded Poles in the past and provided a justification for the post-war Polish settlement. 
Nor does Chwin question the moral and ethical dilemmas raised by the fact that Poles 
simply moved into houses abandoned by Germans. The Polish family in this novel had 
escaped the destruction of Warsaw to take part in the rebuilding and reclaiming of 
172 Chwin, 83. 
173 Shallcross, 119-12i, 125-127. 
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Gdansk in much the same way many Germans had fled from the destruction of the 
eastern territories and would eventually participate in the rebuilding of East and West 
Germany in the late 1940s and 1950s. 174 So many Poles were homeless in the interior of 
Poland and had suffered through the trauma and violence of war. Chwin moreover 
justifies the seizure ofhis protagonists' German property, when Hanemann is rescued by 
J6zek, the father of the protagonist, from being the victim of szabrownictwo (a Polish 
tem1 meaning "looting" which was popular slang after the war in the east). Chwin may 
even be demonstrating his opinion on the issue of this form oflatent guilt, by couching 
Hanemann's defense at the hands of J6zek as being justification for his claim on the 
abandoned apartment. 175 
Stefan Chwin's characters no doubt feel a sense of guilt for the events that had 
transpired in the city; they ultimately assume and do not really question the role of new 
residents in the reclaimed territory. The reader has no way of knowing whether the 
protagonist and his family in Death in Danzig, are even aware of the historical 
exaggerations behind the idea of reclaiming Danzig, to become Gdansk. However, the 
visual evidence of a German past embodied in material culture is blatantly obvious to this 
family. Chwin's memory of these events show both guilt for the actions of the post-war 
Polish government, as well as acceptance of their long term results, based on the need for 
Polish life to re-emerge in Gdansk and Poland at large. 
As this chapter has attempted to show, suffering in the new city of Gdansk 
continued well beyond the capitulation of Danzig in March 1945. Polish authorities 
174 Ibid, 119. 
175 Ibid, 119-121. 
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immediately realized that they were under the authority of another occupation force. 
Nonetheless, their goal was to reshape the future of Gdansk and make it part of an 
emerging communist society. The appearance, population, and history of the city would 
all have to change. For those Germans who had survived capitulation, a period of 
disease, verification, and forced labor would eventually result in the traumatic event of 
expulsion or forced polonization. For the Poles, who felt after enduring so much, they 
had the right to reclaim Gdansk, even if it meant continued suffering for Germans. 
Regardless of the political outcome of the city's re-alignment with Poland, the memories 
of this period are still shared and the debate continues on how future generations ofboth 
Germans and Poles remember the transformation of Danzig to Gdansk. 
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Conclusion 
The reclaiming of Gdansk for Poland created immediate trauma but also cast a 
long shadow over the memories of successive generations of Germans and Poles who had 
been victimized by the war's end. One question which remains germane to this day 
within the memories ofboth German and Poles who survived the trauma of Danzig's 
destruction and Gdansk's re-construction was the overall justification of the post-war 
decision to allow the city to be reclaimed by Poland. The final question, in the interviews 
with Siegfried Lehman and Lajica Lewandowska, asked for their overall opinion of the 
post-war settlement in Gdansk. Both responses were fairly typical considering the 
ethnicities and biographies ofthese two. Lehmann believed that the status ofFree City 
should have been re-instated. When asked if he would move from Australia, where he 
has lived for over three decades, and return to his home if it were to revert to a Free City, 
Lehmann replied "No, I would not return as there would be too many bad 
memories ... memories which should never be forgotten." 176 To this question, 
Lewandowska demonstrated her peculiar understanding of American history by 
comparing the post-war situation to the American civil war, in terms of the stability the 
creation of a Polish city of Gdansk would have on the future of the region. When asked 
what she thought of the idea to renew the Free State, Lewandowska emphatically replied 
"No, no, no! It has to be the way it happened. That's the way it happened ... war is war, it 
. "fi d ,177 WaSJUSh Ie . 
176 Lehmann interview. 
177 Lewandowska interview .. 
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For Siegfried Lehmann, the violence he witnessed was so prominent a memory of 
his young life, that to live there again was inconceivable. Although he briefly lived in 
Cologne, Siegfried Lehmann moved away from the northern hemisphere completely, 
perhaps due to these memories. Lewandowska seems to have repressed her own 
traumatic memory of the war and its aftermath in Gdansk, in positing the creation of a 
Polish city as something that was completely justifiable in the post-war world. While 
many members of her family have subsequently moved to the United States to escape 
communism and the memories ofthis traumascape, she herself has found peace with her 
memories and remains in Gdansk to this day. 
In the German case the city of Gdansk seems to stand almost as an object lesson 
of the history of the war, a constant reminder of the foolishness and dire consequences of 
drinking out ofHitler's poisoned chalice. At the same time, the suffering of Germans 
from Danzig and many other cities and regions across the east, allowed subsequent 
generations of Germans in the west to focus on collective suffering, instead of collective 
guilt. Danzig had been considered a bastion of German economic and cultural 
achievement in the east and its loss to Poland was mourned by Germans. For Germans 
who suffered in Danzig/Gdansk, the memories from this period conjure up images of 
death, execution, forced labor, displacement, evacuation, and inhumane expulsion at the 
hands ofthe Soviets and the Poles. The space of memory that is Danzig/ Gdansk is not 
exceptional is this respect, as many other cities and regions are associated with memories 
of German suffering in the immediate post-war east. However, for those like the Lehman 
family that survived, all that remains of their identity as Danzigers are traumatic 
memories of war. 
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In the Polish case, Gdansk stands as the spoils of war earned in the name of 
generations of suffering under German domination in Danzig. The city was pulled into 
the emerging post-war Polish state with the help of propaganda, internal displacement, 
deliberate withholding of medical attention in the face of disease and starvation, which 
ultimately led to the evacuation of populations, and finally the Potsdam accords. For 
Polish memory, the acquisition of Gdansk was justified for a long-standing history of 
repression, culminating in the Nazi takeover of Danzig and the Polish Corridor. Poland 
and its people had suffered the brunt ofthe atrocities of World War II, perhaps more than 
any other European nation, next to the USSR. Memory of Polish suffering dictated that 
by whatever means, the communist authority "reclaim" Gdansk. 
Even today, a divide exists between Germany and Poland on how to best 
remember the sufferings not only of Danzig/ Gdansk but also of the German expulsions 
at the end of World War II. As German expellees insist on the commemoration of their 
suffering through the creation of a museum dedicated to exploring the expulsions, the 
Polish government has proved less than willing to acknowledge Polish responsibility for 
the expulsions. In August of 2005 the Polish government outright rejected the possibility 
of an Expellee center in Warsaw. President Alexander Kwasniewski believes that such a 
place would only serve to lessen the role of Germany's perpetration ofWorld War II, 
stating that "our attitude on the center is negative." Supporters of the Expellee center, 
such as conservative German Chancellor Angela Merkel, are optimistic that it will be 
b ·1 . d. B 1· 178 m t mstea m er m. 
However, an expellee center in Berlin would not be as significant in terms of its 
location and the possession of memory. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s West 
178 Hardy Graupner, "Poland Rejects Berlin Expellee Center," Deutsche Welle, 8/16/05. 
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Germany had many such museums and exhibits which sought to bring recognition to the 
plight of German expellees and those trapped in the communist east. The fear of the 
Polish government is that such a sight would attempt to work through the memory of 
German suffering in Warsaw, where Germans perpetrated horrendous crimes, is not 
invalid. An expellee center would ask that the Poles recognize their own role as 
perpetrators of suffering, something they have been traditionally reticent to do. If an 
expellee center were to be built in Poland, would not a city like Gdansk be a more 
suitable place? Erika Steinbach, the head of Germany's Union of the Expelled claims to 
hail from a town that was once near Danzig. More importantly, this city with its shared 
heritage presents itself as a place where the memories of sufferings associated with 
World War II are more closely shared between Germans and Poles than either Warsaw or 
Berlin. 
The purpose ofthis analysis has been to try and create a portrayal of the 
"Traumascape" ofDanzig/ Gdansk in the year 1945. I have tried to define a traumascape 
as all the various facets of colliding, interwoven, and shared destruction, violence, fear, 
and retribution which contributed to both German and Polish memory of suffering in this 
particular region. Like a landscape, which focuses on one piece of the world and 
attempts to express its salient characteristics, a traumascape attempts to recreate a certain 
place's darkest and most horrific qualities. Why use Danzig/ Gdansk as an example one 
might ask? Why not Konigsberg/Kalingrad, or Breslau/ Wroclaw, or any other place that 
would certainly fall into the category of a traumascape during the end ofWorld War II? 
These examples, as well as the entire area that became Poland and East Germany, 
certainly have a claim to be studied as a traumascape. However, as stated in the 
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introduction, there does not seem to be any significant work exclusively on the shared 
traumatic general military history and memory of Danzig in the modem era either in 
English, German, or Polish. Such a study certainly has not been written in the context of 
a collection of memoirs, documents, interviews, and personal statements of people who 
suffered through this time period, be they German or Polish, perpetrator or victim or any 
combination thereof. 
While examining the documents, testimonies, interviews, fictitious portrayals, and 
memoirs pertaining to the suffering of the people living in Danzig/ Gdansk, several larger 
issues were raised. Whether it was the period of germanization or nazification of Danzig, 
as well as polonization of Gdansk, the history ofthe city ofDanzig/Gdansk also raises the 
greater questions ofhermeneutical problems of World War II history. Finding a balance 
between suffering inflicted and received is the cardinal problem of German history for 
traumatic history specialist Dominick LaCapra, who argues that no matter how well one 
works through such multifaceted history, historical investigations such as this analysis 
invariably leave one oppressed group historically wronged. 179 For LaCapra there may 
simply be no way to not tip the traumatic scales in favor of either German or Polish 
memory. With respect to traumatic memory, this city has represented different things to 
different people throughout history. Germans and Poles can all point to different periods 
of the city of Danzig when they were the war's victims. With the destruction of Danzig in 
1945, the city of Gdansk emerged as a place that sought to rectify all wrongs of the past, 
by re-populating and rebuilding in order to erase and move on from the past. 
179 Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 
2001), 32-34, 44-45. . 
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It is my belief that in order to clearly work through the history, analyze, and 
hypothesize upon the shared suffering in this place of memory, historians must consider 
the tragedies of all the former and current residents of this place to be as Joanna Stimmel 
wrote, "contemporaneous catastrophes that must be discussed in reference to and 
reverence of each other."180 Only then can one proceed to the epistemological claim that 
considers Danzig and Gdansk as completely separate entities. Based on political events, 
military and diplomatic strategy, as well as social movements in the year 1945, the exact 
moment when the city ceased to be Danzig and became Gdansk is certainly debatable. 
Unquestionably, the year 1945 was the culmination ofthe city's troubled history, 
manifested in the death, rape, evacuation, imprisonment, political repression and 
expulsion of hundreds of thousands of people. It is my contention that the complex 
traumatic history of 1945 and the many terrible memories and experiences during that 
year are precisely what separates the existence of these two cities: Danzig and Gdansk. 
180 Stimmel, 3. 
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